'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎25r] (49/1386)

‘‘Taking Alaska! and the Persian Hulf together we can draw nothing from there. The
102nd are so ineHicient from fever that we must withdraw and replace them. The,35th must
take up all the Persian (lulf detachments which in the present position of affairs cannot be
reduced and may have to be strengthened. Mussulman troops are in the main averse from
lighting Turks and cannot be sent freely to Uarrett while we cannot be sure what their
attitude would be if called on to fight Mussulmans on the Frontier when a Jehad was being
preadied. It is therefore difficult to spare Hindus of any class. It seems to us that those
who are directing the strategy of the Empire should give the situation in Mesopotamia their most
careful consideration. A defeat there would be disastrous to our position in Asia and withdrawal
from that country which might be only alternative would be little better. \\ bile we fully
recognise the great issues in Europe we cannot ( ) in East Africa as in any way vital compared
to those in Mesopotamia. Such information as reaches us from East Africa seems to show that
there is no serious threat to British East Africa. The withdrawal of one brigade of good
troops from East Africa still leaves seven battalions there, most of them, it is true, of inferior
quality, but still capable of being useful on the defensive. A certain amount of pressure
from the Belgian Congo seems to be contemplated, and with the rainy season about to
commence there seems no chance of serious operations against Colony for some time to come.
In these circumstances we would press urgently that the Loyal North Lancashire Kegiment,
29th Punjabis. 2nd Kashmir Kifles. and 13th Rajputs should be sent to Mesopotamia with the
least possible delay. This would leave Wapshare the 98th, 101st, 130th Baluchis, blst. 63rd,
3rd Kashmir Rifles, and the Cwulior, .Jhind. Bharatpur, Kapurthala and Rampur Infantry,
besides his local white volunteers, the King's African Rifles, his other local troops, the
contingent from Rhodesia and the Corps of Frontiersmen of which we have heard. We have
ventured to make these suggestions in view of refusal of our proposal that Indian troops now
in Egvpt should be returned for the service and the protection of Indian interests in
Mesopotamia and at Aden. Our military resources in India have now been ieduced to
bed-rock, and we are onlv able to reinforce Barrett with such items as two battalions which
will be replaced bv two battalions from China, the 7th Haiiana Lancers and a second heavy
battery now on their way to Basra, one battery Territorial Artillery, and possibly a battalion
of Nabha Imperial Infantry. We share your view that it is imperative that Harrett s forces
should be increased to two divisions. You are no doubt aware that since the outbreak of war
we have sent overseas six divisions of infantry and nearly three divisions of cavalry, while in
return for 33 battalions of British infantry we have received 35 battalions of Territorial
infantrv of mixed value. India has, therefore, done her duty to the Empire, and it is quite
impossible, in view of situation on the Frontier and in interior, to do more. It is of no use to
suggest tons that we should take further risks in India. We have heavy responsibilities
towards European and native population that cannot be lightly set aside. Our conclusion,
therefore, is that though we are at one with you in thinking that Barrett’s force should be
increased to at least t wo divisions, we are unable in consequence of our generosity towards
His Majesty's (Jovernment in the early stages of the war to Hud the necessary troops to
complete them, and that responsibility rests with His Majesty's (iovernment not merely to
find the necessary additional troops, but for an}* consequences that may arise due to their
refusal to allow India the use of her own troops to protect her own interests.”
On the 4th March, General Barrett reported the •unfortunate result of a
reconnaissance in force sent out from Ahwaz. In this affair we were driven
hack with the loss of two guns and over 160 casualties. Alarmed by this
regrettable incident the General hastened the despatch to Ahwaz of much
needed reinforcements.
< )n the same date he reported lighting in the Shaiba direction.
A telegram was also received from Sir Percy Gox, which described the
general situation in Mesopotamia as it then presented itself to the military
and political authorities on the spot.
■■ Telc’THiu from Sir P. Cox to the Secretary of State for India, dated
4th March 1915.
“ No. 382 B. General situation
•• Tilin'* line : — Intelligence reports continued by re-commencement of overtures to me by
Sheikhs between Kurna and Amara indicate with little doubt that we have no serious opposition
to anticipate in that direction for the present.
" Knphrates line: — According to military information there are up to now some eight
battalions between ISasiriyeh and Basra, but of these four battalions and a large but fluctuating
force of Arabs are established some 16 miles west of Basra, but are believed to have received
instructions not to attack pending the airival of more troops. Attack on Basra by this force
mav be expected at anv time, but their movements admit of their being watched from day to
day so that there is no likelihood of surprise.
' “ Karan line: -Considerable force of Turks, estimated at about 1,000 together with large
But fluctuating force of Arabs has established itself 10 miles west of Ahwaz. Former appear
to be gradua 11 v gaining in strength. As regards this force Turkish Ambassador at Teheran
has detin it el v given out that their intention is to outflank us at Basra.
u General Barrett has done what he found possible locally to prevent situation getting out
of control, but I can but gather that grave possibilities of rapidly deteriorating situation
resulting from Turkish intrusion into Arabistan are not yet fully appreciated.
" Position described in mv telegram No. 354-B has since developed to the following extent.
Disaffected Bawi have re-occupied Wais. Sheikh of Muhammerah s force at Ahwaz has been
considerably reduced by desertions, and Muhaisiu who remain have now intimated to Sheikh
M.8. 137. k>