'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎29v] (58/1386)

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to us, it was thought that it might offer a rallying point to Turkish reinforce
ments from Baghdad, in which case Basra might possibly be again threatened
from the west, while unquestionably we could not expect the Arabs in the
Euphrates to side with us so long as they had a Turkish garrison in their
midst.
The Nasiriyeh operations were entrusted to Major-General Gorringe.
11is instructions were to secure the occupation of Nasiriyeh and the country
in its vicinity with the object of obtaining an effective control over the
vestein portion of the Basra vilayet and the neighbouring Arab tribes.
The operations commenced on the 27th June and lasted about a month,
Nasiriyeh being captured on the 25th July together with 951 prisoners and
17 guns, as well as much other booty. Our casualties amounted to 533
of all ranks. As stated by Sir John Nixon, “ seldom if ever have troops
buen called upon to campaign in such trying heat,’ and he accords high
pniise to the gallant and devoted manner in which they responded to the
demands made upon them.
hrom this brief digression to the Euphrates we may revert once more to
the main theatre of ivar along the Tigris. During dune, the Tigris column
in spite of the season had not been inactive and reconnaissances had been
pushed up the river towards El Gharbi. This gradual extension of the
sphere ot our military operations, with its resultant attenuation of strength
ivas regarded with some anxiety by the Secretary of State, more especially
as it involved the withdrawal of troops from Basra and Ahwaz. General
Nixon too had reported (24th dune) the concentration of Turkish troops at
Kut-el-Amara and their forward movement down the Tigris. The political
situation in Persia and at Aden was also very critical about this period
and m view of all these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain considered
that caution must be impressed. Idle following telegram was therefore
despatched :—
“ telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 12th July 1915.
“19hQ Reference protection of Anglo-Persian oil interests. The Admiralty are most
an vious that there should be no furtlm" — ^ v 1
The capture of Nasiriyeh, however, had a stimulating effect on the
authorities m Mesopotamia and India.— L'appetit vicnt cn mcnigecnit !
“ Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary .of State, dated 27th July 1915.
“No. H 6582 Reference my telegram of 25th instant, A T o. H. 6543. Now that Nasiriveh
has been occupied the occupation of Kut al-Amarah is considered bv us to be a straWic
necessity kut-al-Amarah is only four miles beyond limit of Basra Vilayet - it commands
the lower reaches of the Tigris and also the Euphrates by way of Slmtt-ihka and t
occupation will facilitate the reinforcement of our position on either river and also enable us
to control the powerful Bam Lam tribe and effectively safeguard the oilfields against
fro ”' * e 1 '"‘'f Once securely in possession, we conkl probably mluce material,
s.VWVW 0 ” 8 / t S ' 1 ''- Vel1 f" Ama ? '"“i thus economise our troops. Nixon has owino to
s ck ( ) found , necessary to demand remforcements. lie is also being directed to despatch
ant Indian battalion to liuslnre In order to strengthen Nixon for the purpose of securing
kut-al-Amarah, we consider 28th Brigade should be moved from Aden to Faroe I), uhe, , "s
can he spared fro,,, Aden We agree with Toungliusband, rule his telegram. Nos
j ’ n ' 0 ', T 'V”, V 1 ’J ‘ Ju y am “ 4th Jll k v respectively, that an advance to Label
should not be undertake,, for the present. It will therefore be possible to spare 28th Brimlde
10111 Aden shoitlj in order to assist Nixon in the capture of Kiit-al-Amarah, after which the
brigade could again return to India Wo request your sanction to our autlm-isine Nixon to
capture Kut-ahAmaraI, and to employ 28th Brigade in the operation, which we edeu a e
would begin not later than early September and should he completed in time for the 28tb
Brigade to be back m Aden by November.
This telegram
did
, • ^ rp. . „ 110t a ^ a 3 T 0,, i' apprehensions, and further it was
obvious that it reinforcements were necessary they would have to lie drawn
lrom ^asinyeh or from Basra and Ahwaz, as the Secretary of State for War
urgently required the 2Sth Brigade back in Egypt.