'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎31r] (61/1386)

/ his Document is the jiropertij o f His Britannic Majesty's (iovernment.
SECRET.
Precis of Correspondence regarding the ^Lesopotaniian
E\j)edition—Its Genesis and Development.
Prepared in the Military Department of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
(IV.)
Part Hi. brought this narrative down to the capture of Kut-el-Amara on
the _.)th September. I'our days Jater the head of the pursuit had readied
Bagheila about half way to Aziziyah.
< hi the same day (3rd October; General Nixon telegraphed, reportino-
various movements and details. His telegram ended thus :—
No. 129/200/1. Our river column is now only at Shidhaif Ash Sharqi, and no chance of
surprising or stain).eding their remainders. I consider I am strong enough to open road to
Baghdad, and with tins intention 1 propose to concentrate at Aziziyah. But this concentration
must be partly hy land.^ Families of Germans and Turkish officials are said to he leaving
Baghdad tor Aleppo. From military point of view it is highly desirable to capture enemy’s
steamers which ar this season cannot get far up stream of Baghdad.”
, 0n tlie 4th October the Military Secretary submitted a Minute to the
Secrelary of State, from which the following extracts are here given : —
n 1 ! } \ e vlt h H ' V at K^t-H-Amara is of so complete a nature that the idea of pushing on to
nag lid ad will certainly be revived. Pressure will be brought on us. either directly by
; ir : • Nlx<,u ; m,t S ' 1 ' Percy Cox, who primd facie are in the best position to judge of its
casi nhty, or indirectly by an agitation in the Press or in commercial circles. It may*even be
urged, and there is much force in the argument, that it is advisable on political grounds on
accountot the world-wide prestige which the occupation of Baghdad would confer. " Certainly
strong arguments can be advanced for its occupation, and the ease with which the operation
can >e carried out will be impressed on us with such cogency and insistence that the proposal
wilt be difficult to resist. The very glamour attaching to so historic a citv is in itself a
temptation, and it is with extreme reluctance that I advocate a policy of caution which will
certainly be unpopular, and perhaps difficult to justify in the minds of those who are not
intimate with the intricacies of the problem.
•• The force under General Nixon comprises two Divisions of Infantry and a Brigade of
Cavalry. Tins force occupies a considerable area in the midst of a doubtful and possibly
hostile population. It also has to protect important British interests in the Anglo-Persian
Oilfields as well as at Hushire and Basra. The consequence is it cannot be concentrated.
• Such a force may be sufficient to expel the Turks from Baghdad. That is a question
which can only be answered by General Nixon on local information, but the problem does not
end at the capture of Baghdad. r J he city will absorb a garrison of at least a Brigade. This
leaves us only two weak Brigades to cope with any eventuality that may arise.
•• - he debnx of the Mesopotamian Army Corps will probably retire towards Mosul, and if
they were hereafter—-say, three months hence—reinforced by a Turkish Division either from
the Caucasus or Syria, our reduced Division of 5,000 men would have a formidable task to
resist the enemy’s advance. If it were supported by disaffected Arabs or a religious rising we
might ha\ e to evacuate Baghdad and retire to our present strong strategical position at the
junction of the Tigris and Shatt-el-Hai. Such a sequel to the occupation of Bao-hdad would
reverberate through the East from Constantinople to Delhi, and might have a disastrous
political effect far outweighing the credit we would now acquire by its capture. The Arabs
along our line of retreat would certainly rise against ns, and our communications would
probably be threatened all along the Tigris as far as Kurna. Whereas if we sit tio-ht at
Ivut-el-Amara we can consolidate our control of the Basra Vi lay at and fortifv a strono-
position at the apex of the triangle formed by the Tigris and Shatt-el-Hai which with our
Naval command of the rivers would be unassailable by any but a very superior force
accompanied by heavy artillery, while it would be at the same time completely cover the main
approaches to the territory now occupied by us. Bv such a militarv policv we can ensure our
present hold of the country with the troops now at our disposal, whereas under the more
ambitious and alluring Baghdad policy we should he weak everywhere and unable to maintain
our position without a considerable addition to our present strength.
MS 174 32—41916 a