'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎56v] (112/1386)

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li Should Turkey become a belligerent management of expedition will devolve on von, but
instructions as to scope of operations will, of course, come from me.
l ' Meanwhile you should prepare remainder of Division for despatch, but we do not propose
to send more troops to Abadan till Turkey shows her hand, though it may be advisable to
send a first reinforcement to Basidu as a near support.
•• If political situation presages war the whole Division would be wanted and land transport
would become necessary. With this in view you might think it convenient to move Division
gradually by rail and sea to Karachi, where presumably you would be better able to equip
with mule transport.
“ Shakespear will leave by next mail for Bombay and I am instructing him to endeavour to
communicate with Bin Saood.
“ Presume vou will detail a political officer to accompany leading troops.
“Admiralty requested to make arrangements for disembarkation with Naval Commander-
in-Chief.
“ Shall be glad to have a full expression of your views,”
The above telegram is important. The portion in italics detines the
exact scope of the expedition in its initial stage before Turkey became a
belligerent.
“ From Viceroy to Secretarv of State for India, dated 7th October 1914.
“ Conlidential. In reply to your telegram No. 1158 of 5th October in which you ask for
a full expression of my views upon the Abadan project, I venture to put forward following
considerations after consulting Commander-in-Chief.
“ It appears to us perfectly clear that the policy of Turkey, which is not in a position to
give real material assistance to the enemy, is dominated by Germany, whose aim is to create
a situation in which it will appear that Turkey is the object of aggression of one or more
Christian Powers. \ iolations of neutrality, as in case of Goeben, are too technical to be
understood by the Mahomedan masses, but the presence of belligerent ships and the dis
embarkation of troops in Turkish waters are facts of which the provocative character are
apparent to all. That such provocation should be given by Indian ships or troops will create
a bad effect in India and Afghanistan and must be to play into the hands of Germanv. I
agree with Sir L. Mallet that at present moment, presence of three of our ships in the
Shatt el Arab is not defensible from an international point of view, but to send troops into
these neutral waters would probably be met by firing on our ships from the Fort at Fao.
“ Materially this would do us no harm(but if we took no action our prestige in the Gulf
would vanish, while if we retaliated we should place ourselves entirely in the wrong.
“ Disembarkation at Abadan presents no difficulty from a military point of view, but to do
so will be to walk deliberately into a trap not unskilfully laid for us. Before any final
decision to disembark troops at Abadan is taken, 1 trust His Majesty’s Government will
consider very carefully the above aspect of the question and particularly effect which it is
likely to have upon the attitude of Mahomedans in India, which is at present very satis
factory An East India Company trading post. in every way, particularly in view of our weakened military position in India, and on
the Frontier, after the despatch to the theatre of war of bulk of the Army in India, with all
our modern artillery, Ac.
“It is quite clear nothing can really secure safety of oil works except the occupation of
Abadan, but we see no reason to Anticipate an attack upon them and we doubt their value
being so great as to outweigh consequences of an apparent attack by us on Turkev.
“ Again, the occupation of Abadan by a large military force would almost certainly evoke
a protest by Persia, and in the event of hostilities with Turkey would constitute a violation of
neutrality of Persia, and would afford a pretext to Turkey for the extension of the frontier at
the expense of Persia.
“ If, on the other hand, object in view is merely to demonstrate at the head of the Gulf,
other alternatives present themselves.
“ To land troops at Bassidu would be known immediately all over the Gulf, and would
create an immense impression. To this there could be no possible political objection, but from
a military point of view the difficulties of water supply on the island are almost insuperable.
“ After Bassidu, Bahrein is politically the nearest approach to British territorylin the Gulf,
and there seem to be no serious objections to this alternative. The Sheikh is old and not
likelv to be obstructive, if the situation were explained to him. There is also an advantage
in favour of Bahrein in the fact of our having a force there would strengthen our hands and
assist our overtures to Bind Saood and the Sheikh ^Katr. From a military point of view onlv
objection to Bahrein is difficulty of embarking and disembarking troops, owing to shallowness
of the water, but this could be mitigated by plentiful, supply of boats. 1 propose to send
Sir P. Cox as political officer with any expedition to the Gulf, since his knowledge of the
Chiefs and of Gulf politics is unique. "
As commenls on the above telegram from the Viceroy the following may
be read : —
“From Foreign Office to Sir L. Mallet (Constantinople), dated 7th October 1914.
*♦
“ No. 644. His Majesty’s Ships Odin, Espiegle, and Dalhousie are not in Turkish waters,
of wateis which are not Turkish.
“Instructions are being sent that one of these ships is to remain at Muhammerah, which is
not Turkish, and the other two are to keep outside Turkish territorial waters, which according to