'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎237r] (479/1386)

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should be allowed to give him the necessary permission to attack, but only on the clear
understanding" that he.is not to attempt to enter, or .occupy Baghdad. • , • • •
“2. from the information before the Committee, there- y era Id appear to oe no
defensive position near Baghdad of any great strength. -But it rs thought that the Baghdad,
district, if occupied bv a sufficient force, offers considerable strategic advantages. - " c
“ 3 . Without Baghdad and the surroixnding district as a base, the lurks could still assemble
considerable forces and undertake offensive operations. But with Baghdad nvtheir possession
they would be much more favourably situated both , for the concentration of force and the
assumption of the offensive. ,■> r\ „
4 . From their imperfect knowledge of events in other theatres of war the ( omnnttee are
unable to foresee with any certainty the effect which a British occupation of Baghdad would
have on the Turkish forces engaged against the Russians and against ourselves in tie
fhit d.mdh^ ^ capture b y lls of Baghdad would uhdonbtedly be an inducement to the Turks
to withdraw force from other quarters in the hope of retaking that city, the extent to which
they would be able to do this would depend on events elsewhere. The Committee accept the
estimate of the General Staff that the Turks might in certain circumstances have bO,UUU men
at their disposal, but consider that, even if this number of men were available, it would be a
very difficult operation to concentrate them in Mesopotamia and undertake offensive operations
if Baghdad were in our possession.
The Committee also had before them a Memorandum submitted on the
(kh October by the Political Department, India Cilice, advocating the
advance to Baghdad, on general considerations and more especially because
of the control which its occupation would give us over the Baghdad-
Kermanshah route—the Germans’main line of communication with Persia.
The danger of the existing situation in Persia was emphasised and its
probable reaction on the attitude of Afghanistan and the north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. .
It was recognised, indeed, that retreat from Baghdad, altei occupation,
would have most unfortunate political results ; but it appeared to the
Political Secretnry that if the Turks were strong enough to turn us cut of
Baghdad, they would be strong enough, if we refrained from occupying it,
ro create such a situation in Mesopotamia and Persia that withdrawal from
Kut-el-Amara itself would be necessary, and the political consequences of
this would be almost as disastrous as those of withdrawal from Baghdad.
The conclusion was reached that “we are bound to take risks, whether we
no to Baghdad or stay where we are.
But political considerations
“ appear to point decidedly towards the adoption of the bolder course.
It is clear from this that both on political and military grounds the
occupation of Baghdad vas considered most desirable if certain reinforce
ments could be assured. Tailing this Geiferal Nixon was not to attempt to
occupy Baghdad.
It is unnecessary to quote here the Report in full, but the following
extracts show the grounds on which, the Committee arrived at conclusion 1 :
The Desirability of an Ad ranee to Ttatjhdad.
‘"5 On unlit a rv grounds 1 ho capture an d occupation of Baghdad offer distinct and solid
advantages. The ' enemy, apart from the blow which his prestige would sustain, would be
deprived of an important trade centre, a valuable depot, a base, and a railhead (of the section
of the Baghdad railway now working from Samarra to Baghdad). Our forces would be
astride the main route from Kurope through Kermanshah to the interior of Persia, and
would deprive the Germans of a base for their intrigues in the Middle Fast.
“ The Practicabilitij of an Advance.
“ 6 . The General Stall', 'War Office, the Connnander-in-Cliief in India, the Military
Secretary, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , and the local military authorities are all in agreement in the opinion,
in which the Committee concur, that the British forces at present in Mesopotamia, though
apparently adequate for the capture of Baghdad, are not sufficient to ensure its retention,
which is regarded as essential. General Sir John Nixon lias stated that if the Turks should
turn their serious attention to the recovery of Baghdad, and should send to Mesopotamia the
laro-e organised forces that would be needed for such an operation, he would require one division
and one British cavalry regiment in addition to his present force. 'The Committee consider
that a force not less than this is immediately necessary to hold Baghdad, but they think that.,
two regiments of Indian cavalry might be substituted if a British cavalry regiment is not
available. It is essential that these troops should reach Basra at the earliest possible
date, as their presence will ba required at Baghdad to ensure its occupation against attempts
on the part of the Turks to re-take the city. For this reason t he Committee have recommended
that the reinforcements should begin to arrive at Basra within four weeks of the issue of orders
for the advance. - ... . ...
“ In order to provide for possible eventual ities,.a second division, or those units of a division
which can be suitably employed in Mesopotamia, should be held in readiness to follow the first
as soon as" required! In "the event- of the Turks being in a position later on to concentrate
forces from distant quarters on the Upper Tigris, with the object of offensive operations oh "a
laree scale, even these two divisions may prove insufficient, and it may be necessary in 191t>
jo send further reinloicementS. ’