'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎249v] (504/1386)

that they now know the whole of Arabistan is against them, and that if they cannot be at
once yeinforced by a large force of Arabs or by more British troops they will abandon Ahwaz.
Hardly any Chaab now remain loyal. Ramus has risen and rebels there have now overrun
Jarrahi district. Meanwhile our small force on right bank of the Karun consisting of two
battalions of infantry, one and a half troops of cavalry, two field guns and two mountain guns,
though perhaps sufficiently strong to defend itself if attacked by Turkish force at present
threatening it can do little or nothing to protect Ahwaz if attacked by Arabs from east.
“ Regret to appear as an alarmist, but it is impossible to neglect the consideration that a
seizure of Ahwaz by a hostile force, apart from providing the enemy with an excellent and
well-supplied base from which to threaten our flank, would mean the isolation of the oil-field
settlement and threaten indefinite cessation of work at Abadan and loss of some millions of
money. It would involve enormous loss of prestige to us and greatly stimulate native rising
iu Arabistan and extend its scope.
“ It is possible that His Majesty’s Government have reason to hope that Turkish activity
in this direction will shortly collapse owing to pressure applied elsewhere ; such a remedy,
however, will operate too slowly to affect lively possibilities of the present situation in
Arabistan, and I would earnestly urge that unless it is certain that we are at the end of our
available resources such military measures may be at once sanctioned as will give us speedy
control of the situation while it is still possible."
A Cabinet Council was held the same afternoon, and, in accordance with
the views of the Government, the following telegram was despatched:—
“ Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy. Army Department,
dated 4th March 1915.
“1683. Your H. 3517 together with Barrett's telegram 224 G. regarding affair near
Ahwaz has been fully considered to-day by the Cabinet, who have decided that as you find a
difficulty in forming a normal mixed Brigade, you should despatch as soon as possible a
Brigade of Territorials. The numerical deficiency thus caused in India will be replaced as
soon as possible either from Egypt or East Africa, in accordance with the military situation.
[ hope the Dardanelles operations will shortly relieve the political tension, and enable us to
give greater consideration to India.”
Lord Crewe was not altogether satisfied witth the above decision as it
seriously diminished the European garrison of India, at what might prove a
critical moment, and on the following day. after further consultation with
his colleagues, he obtained the concurrence of His Majesty’s Government to
the following telegram : —
“ Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department,
dated 5th March 1915.
“ 1689. In modification of my Military telegram, 1683. Further consideration of situation
in Mesopotamia makes me believe it would be wiser to send mixed force composed of suitable
units from India at once rather than four territorial bated ions as His Majesty’s Government
originally desired ; this both on general grounds and owing to approach of "hot weather in
Mesopotamia. Secretary of State for War has pressed Commander-in-Chief in Egypt to
return you at any rate a brigade if lie can regard Suez Canal as secured ajrainst present
attack, but in any case you and Commander-in-Chief must understand that His Majesty's
Government definitely order the strengthening of General Barrett’s force at once, and that
you are both entirely relieved of responsibility for consequences of further reduction of Indian
internal defences for this purpose.”
This decision, as will be seen later on in this narrative, probably saved
the situation, as it ensured General Barrett’s force being brought up to a
strength of two Divisions.
The next day General Barrett reported that steps had been taken to
concentrate a Brigade at Ahwaz, and also that the enemy in consequence of
their heavy losses appeared to be abandoning the offensive.
The following appreciation of the situation was received from Simla the
same day :—
“ Telegram from Chief of the General Staff, India, to the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, dated 6th March 1916.
“ No. S. 4729 I. 42. Reports from Basra indicate that on the Euphrates line the main
Turkish concentration is at Nasiriyeh, where on 28th February the strength was estimated at
7 battalions and 12 guns, besides tribesmen. It is estimated that advanced troops at
Nakhailah number 8,000 men with eight guns, including 1,500 men, mostly regulars.
Reinforcements of unknown strength with 12 guns are believed to have reached Nasiriyeh
from Constantinople about the middle of January, and may possibly be included in the above
totals.
“ In the action, near Shaiba on 3rd March only mounted men were seen. In the action on
the 3rd March at Ghadir it was estimated that the enemy’s strength was 500 Turkish troops,
three field guns, and 12,000 Arabs, of whom about 200 were mounted. The Turkish Com
mander was Khalil Bey. Do you know anything about him ? Said Nameh and Sheikh
Ghadhan were present also. It is reported that the enemy lost 300 killed, including the