'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎255v] (516/1386)

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“In my judgment it Avill not be nise (o go to Baghdad unless we can increase the force by a
w bole Division of Infantry and one or two Cavalry regiments, and this we know is impracticable
unless the Indian troops are withdrawn from France.
“ The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that we cannot under present circum
stances go to Baghdad without incurring unjustifiable-risks. It must be remembered that
during the winter the Russians are not likely to be able to make any advance into Armenia,
and consequently the Turks can very well spare a division or two from the Armenian army
at this season to reinforce the Mesopotamian troops.
“ We do not know what may now be the strength of the Mesopotamian force, but we have,
been told of a Brigade which was recently at Kifri and is now letiring to Baghdad, and
presumably there is a Baghdad garrison apart from the force beaten at Kut-el-Amara, so
probably, not counting Arabs, the Turks can still muster some 10,000 men at or near
Baghdad. If we go to Baghdad and the enemy retires to Samarra, they may very possibly be
reinforced there by another 10,000 men or more from Armenia, and yet another reinforcement
trom Aleppo, 1 so 1 greatly doubt whether we can hold Baghdad for any length of time w.th
our present force.
“ We have practically no reserves to depend on and we must play a safe 1 game ami'husbaiid
our sorely strained military resources.
“ 1 have felt it my duty to place these eonsiderati >us before the Secretary of State because
everything points to our hands being forced, unless we can arrest the present trend, of events
by a prompt and imperative decision.
“ Kut-el-Amara is only about 120 miles by road from Baghdad, although bv river it is 220
miles, and General Nixon’s advance guard, in boats, has already covered some 20 miles of that
distance. I see no indication of a halt in the pursuit, though in the present state of the river
I also see no probability of being able to overtake the enemy. If we do not stop him, General
Xixon will soon be in Baghdad regardless of orders, and we shall then be faced by the grave-
alternative of. either having "to withdraw again or of making our occupation effective. Dither
course involves serious considerations, more especially in view of the gloomy situation in the
near East.”
On that same evening (the 4th October) the Secretary of State
telegraphed as follows to the Viceroy :—
‘- From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Army Department, dated 4th October 1915.
“3071. I shall be glad to know what Nixon’s present intentions are, as if, owing to
navigation troubles, there is no probability of catching and smashing the retreat in y-enemv
there is no object in continuing the pursuit. ’
“ The orders con\e\ r ed in my 1812 of 24th April, and 3002 of ^th August still hold cood.
subject to course of events at Baghdad and elsewhere and to the recommendations you may
now make.
“ Please cable your estimate of enemy’s present strength in Mesopotamia.”
The orders above referred to limited the operations to tin Basra Vilaval
vide pp. 24 and 30, IVnrt III.
About the same time a Memorandum dated Gth October was prepared
by the General Staff, War Othce, which though submitted a few days later
may conveniently be entered here : —
“Extracts from Memorandum by the General Staff, War Office,
“ It is probably quite feasible for Sir J. Nixon's force to advance to and seize Baghdad.
The question is whether he would be able to remain there.
“ For reasons stated in paragraph 4 below it appears quite possible for the Turks to
assemble a very superior force, whose arrival would lead to active operations bv the Arabs
against our long and difficult line of coir'nnunicatior.s.
“ It seems to us that to attempt to hold Baghdad, except with a force very much larger than
Sir Nixon's, and with proportionately increased river transport, would be to court disaster,
liven supposing that we were able to hold.it in the face of am force the Turks could brim-
against it, it is doubtful if we should be able to maintain our supply service during the months
when the Tigris is low.
“ We have not been able to discover from maps or reports any position in the ueinhbour-
hood of Baghdad which would enable us to hold the town or district against a superior enernv.
Whatever line w r e took up would leave it open to the enemy to operate against our flank arid
lino of communications.
“3. We see no reason why the Turks should not be able to concentrate a large force
against us if we are holding a position at Baghdad. In fact it seems easier for them to con
centrate against ns there than it would he at Kut-el Amara. There are no doubt difficulties
in the way of transport and supply, but we think these could be overcome.
“4 The Turks knowing that our hands are full and that we are withdrawhe-
troops from Gallipoli to the Balkans, can reduce their forces in Syria—Palestine, Hedjaz and
Asyr—Djemil could probably move 20,000 troops in t his way from Syria to Mesopotamia, and
20,000 could easily be spared from the Gallipoli. The Russian inactivity in the Caucasus
makes it quite feasible for the Turks to spare 15,000 or 20,000 from that front, especially ir
the winter time.
“ It therefore will become possible for f)0,000 Turks tube assembled from the three districts
mentioned above, and to be conveyed in the course of some weeks to Baghdad. The occupation
i Mr. Marling lias since reported in telegram No :17s, dated 4tli October ]<)lo, that Jamal Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. is said to bo
leaving Syria for Baghdad with 6,(X)0 men from the Egyptian Expeditionary Force,