'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎258r] (521/1386)

M.S 174. C
37
On the same date, (ICth Oetober) the Military Secretary, Lidia Office,
submitted a supplementary mimite in consequence of the information
icceived from India and from General Kixon subsequent to the date on
which the Committee had drafted its Report {vide Committee of Imperial
Defence Paper, Secret, G. 31, of October PJ15).
The following extracts indicate a certain modification of the views he had
previously expressed :—•
?’i he ^° re C Ve have a firm P romise of tvvo divisions, I am entirely in favour of going to
‘'aghdad, wlule, if we get only one division added to Force ‘ D,’ we might still consider the
advisability of a raid and retirement. That is to say, Greneral Nixon, with two divisions and
three cavalry regiments in the Baghdad area, will be able, whatever the Turks may do—
“ (I) d'o spoil their advanced base by removing or destroying all stores and transport n6v
- ' available in the area.
“ (2) To. cut them off from all communication with Persia for at least two Or three
months.
“ (B To postpone trouble from Afghanistan for that period.
“ (4) To keep the Basra vilayet and the oilfields quiet for a like period/’
* * # # ^
“ Before tlie three months have elapsed the position may have entirely changed in our
favour elsewhere, but whatever we decide we must decide quickly or the* moral effect of
Kut-el-Amara. will have worn off.
“ 1 have described the advantages of offensive action, but I am not oblivious to its danger-;.
The political effect of eventual retirement will be bad, but there will have been compensatory
ad vai.tages, and, moreover, avc should have been given time to prepare a formidable Torres
Vcdras at Kut-el-Amara, and some of our gunboats Avill be ready to guard the river.”
These various papers were considered by the War Council on the
21st October, and their conclusions were embodied in the Secretary of
State’s private telegram of the same date, which was also in reply to" the
Viceroy’s private telegram of that date. The telegrams in question were as
follows
“ From Viceroy, 21st October 1915.
“ Private. Your private telegram of 18th instant. Baghdad.
“Government of India are in entire agreement with His Majesty's Government as to
political and strategic advantages of the capture and occupation of Baghdad which are
emphasised by contents of Mr. Marling’s telegram of 15th Oetober. but we regard internal
security of India and the security of our frontier as our first pre-occupation, and in our present
depleted military situation are quite unable to send a further force of strength of a division of
troops from India to Mesopotamia.
“ After consulting Commander-in-Chief I consider that there are three alternatives before
us ;—
“(1). Take and occupy Baghdad. This Avill present no difficult}- whatever, provided that
we are guaranteed reinforcements of a full division of troops reaching Mesopotamia within
two months from now. This Avill he the most satisfactory solution.
“ (2) Attack the Turks, raid Baghdad, capturing the few steamers that remain and stores,
'releasing the English female captives, destroying the railway north of Baghdad and
dominating the city by river patrols from a camp south of Baghdad. This would have a good
ppliticail effect, and the fact that we were not in actual occupation of Baghdad might not
precipitate the despatch of Turkish reinforcements to recapture it. This, from a political
point'of view, would be only the second best alternative, but it would not require addition of
a whole division to carry it out.
“ The Commander-in-Chief from a military point of view dislikes this solution, and would
prefer either (1) or (3). He considers that Baghdad, being great centre of supplies and a
valuable base for whichever side is in possession of it, we must either hold it ourselves or
keep Well away from it. He does not think that it is possible to (dominate ?) it from south.
We should have to be camped close to the suburbs, which in his opinion gives us all the
disadvantages and none of the advantages of occupation. His view is that unless we hold
Baghdad Turkish reinforcements will be gradually dribbled into it and we may be attacked
in. strength without warning unless we are as far away as Kut-el-Amara. Nixon goes so far
as to ednsider that even without reinforcements his army would be safer in and north of
Baghdad than anywhere south of it, and Commander-in-Chief lays great stress on the value
of Baghdad-Samarra railway in that it would prevent any possibility of surprise attack on us
He considers that all our interests lie in our holding Baghdad, but recognises that without
addition our present (forces) might he driven out of it, and that this might involve a very
difficult and dangerous retreat down the river. Shortly, he is opposed to a raid on Baghdad
. followed by a withdrawal. He is strongly in favour of holding Baghdad if reinforcements
are forthcoming. If they are not forthcoming, he prefers safety of Kut-el-Amara position.
He feels, hoAvever, that present military situation is such that it may at any time become
'necessary to occupy Baghdad even with our existing forces, and accept the risk involved.
“ My own comment upon the Commander-in-chief’s view is that from apolitical point of
view it would be disastrous to be driven out of Baghdad.
“ (3) Remain in a defensive position at Kut-el-Amara. J'his is a course that does not
appeal to us, for it shows weakness Avhich will be recognised both by Turk- and the tiibes,
and may force our hands into advancing after all.