'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎261r] (527/1386)

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T/iis Document is the property of the Secretary of Slate for India. ^ *
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Minute, 2nd May 1916.
As the situation on the Indian 1 rentier may at any moment become
acutely dangerous, it would seem advisable to place on record the views of
the Military Department as to the factors governing our military strategy on
that Frontier under present conditions, for we may at any moment be called
on to take an immediate decision. If “Jehad ” is declared Afghan strategy
will assuredly be guided by German advisers, while theAlullahs and Frontier
tribes will as certainly be influenced by the Turkish emissaries now in
Kabul. Therefore we shall have to encounter not wild and chaotic attacks
like those of the Afghan war of 1878-80 or the Frontier rising of 1897, but
a sane and well-considered strategy and a consistent military policy. That
being so, we may expect well-timed simultaneous attacks all along the'
Frontier from Buner to Zhob combined with a strong concentrated Afghan
thrust towards Landi Kotal, or possibly Kurram.
Assuming that such will be the enemy strategy, we ought to be prepared
to meet it at all important points, as an enemy success at any such point
will have a bad moral elfect throughout India, where we have many insidious
hostile factors to contend with.
The major points of importance are : —
(1) The Khaibar.
(T) The Peshawar Valley and bridge over the Indus at Attock.
(3) The Kurrum (during the summer).
(4) Kohat and the Kushalgaih bridge over the Indus.
(5) Quetta and the passes over the K ho jay.
Minor objectives for the enemy are : —
(G) Bannu and the Tochi Valley.
(7) Tank and the Gonial Pass.
These seven points practically close every military avenue into India
from the Forth-west.
I will discuss them as briefly as possible seriatim.
(1) The Khaibar must be held at its western end near Landi Kotal. It
will take some time for the Afghans to make an attack in force on this
formidable position, but the prospect of forcing the Khaibar will be
enormously improved if Landi Kotal could' be rushed by the Afridis as in
1897, when the Khaibar Rifles were left to shift for themselves. “The
Khaibar Rifles” is a local corps of Afridis, Shinwaris, Shilmaries, Mula-
garis, &c., who cannot be expected to resist fanatical or tribal influences if
they are unsupported. Indeed, they are'more likely to succumb under
present circumstances than they were in- 1897. Therefore, unless they
receive timely support Lan li Kotal will certainly be lost, and the Afghan
attack on Peshawar correspondingly facilitated. If, on the other hand, the
Khaibar movable column were in actual occupation of Landi Kotal, no such
tribal attack could be successful, and indeed it would not be attempted. We
should thus be given time to concentrate an adequate force at Landi Kotal
to resist an attack by the whole strength of the Afghan Army. The Landi
Kotal position is an incomparable natural fortress which can be held bv a
Division against any Afghan army so long as the Afridis remain loval, but
with the Afridis against us it would take two Divisions.
As General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Division, 1 have frequently
studied its defence both on paper and on the ground, and the more I
studied it the more was I impressed with its tremendous possibilities.
Even Alexander the Great dared not attempt to storm it, but turned it via
Bajaur and Chakdara. It is to make sure of possessing this incomparable
line of defence that 1 urge as a measure of vital importance the despa ch of
the Khaibar movable column the moment the situation begins t) look
MS JOl C—5 1910
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