'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎377v] (764/1386)

immediate steps to remedy as far as may be feasible ihe present dilemma
of affairs; he has, therefore, desired me to note what can be done at once
without detriment to the existing system.
The principal defect of the present organisation is —pace Sir OhYloore
Oreagh—excesssive centralisation at Simla with consequent congestion of
business.
There are two other serious defects, viz., the practical inability of the
Commander-in-Chief to absent himself from the headquarters of Govern
ment, with consequent loss of personal touch with the Army, and
the dangerous extent to which the Viceroy and his Council are entirely
dependent on the views of one sole military adviser;
Having stated the defects of the present system, it now remains to
suggest what, in my opinion, are palliatives which can be at once applied
without serious detriment to the existing conditions during war. We cannot
of course, at this crisis, revive the Military Department, or even create a
full-blown Military Supply Department capable of performing its functions.
Wc* clearly cannot resuscitate the Army Commands as organized prior to
1903 as none of those measures, even if possible, would be accepted by so
confirmed an opponent to them as the present Commander-in-Chief. We
must, therefore, consider some temporary expedient to lighten the duties of
the Commander-in-Chief. What we can, I think, do, is (1) to duplicate, so
to speak, the Commander-in-Chief; (2) to make greater use of Army
Commanders.
As regards the first proposition I would suggest an entirely new
departure, and I would appoint a senior General as Chief of the Staff, 1 who
should be, in a literal sense, the > Deputy of the Commander-in-Ch’ef,
and clothed with all necessary authority to act for him, and in ids
absence, to issue orders in his name, lie would not, of course, be a
Member of the Government, nor, indeed, could he be one without special
Statutory provision, but he might, in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief,
be summoned to attend meetings of the Executive Council whenever
military questions were under consideration. He should have the right
to speak at such Councils and to record “minutes ’’ on all military questions,
though, of course, not to vote, and~-Jie would exercise, so far as is
permissible by law or regulation-the functions of the ^Commander-in-
Chief in the absence of-the latter. He would, in fact, be a recognised
“Second in Command.” The object and advantage of this system would be
to enable the Commander-in-Chief to make tours of inspection himself, leaving
his deputy with the Government to act for him in all respects except, of
course, as a member of the Governor-General’s Council. Similarly, if the
Commarfder-in-Chief so desired, the Chief of the Staff would proceed on tour
on. behalf of the Commander-in-Chief and make inspections of troops, stations,
forts, departments, Ac., clothed with all necessary authority, while the
Commander-in-Chief could thus remain at headquarters without detriment
to his more active functions. If both the Commander-in-Chief and his
deputy were at the seat of Government together, as would doubtless be the
case for at least three months of the hot weather, the former would be able
to delegate to the latter such administrative army business as he thought fit
<t measure which would not only afford him relief from excessive office work
but might secure stricter supervision . of army business. Of course, the
■success of such a system would depend entirely on a thorough and complete
understanding and loyal co-operation between the Commander-in-Ohief and
his Chief of the Staff. Any jealousy or distrust on the one side or undue
assumption of authority on the other would be fatal to successful co-operation'
and therefore it is essential that the Commander-in-Chief should have a
considerable voice in the selection of the Chief of the Staff.
Idle second remedial measure which I have suggested above is to make'
greater use of the Army Commanders. Asamitterof fact these appoint
ments have practically lapsed since General Nixon took the lield in April
1915. At Lord Chelmsford’s instigation the Northern Army Command has
1 The difference between “ Chief of the Staff ” and “ Chief of the General Staff” will of
cour.se, be understood. The former supervises all the Staff business of an Army, tbe latter-
onff the General Staff of an Army, Operations, Intelligence, and Staff Duties.