'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎384v] (778/1386)

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fir by yon. However, while military operations are actually progressing and whilst the
military situation in Lower Mesopotamia is so uncertain we feel that it would not he desirable,
but would even be dangerous, to restrict him by definite orders which might not tit in with
local situation confronting him. * * * * For the present, therefore, any alteration of our
original instructions to him is not thought desirable by us. Nixon will, under the original
destructions, forward scheme for occupation of vilayet of Basra, inclusive of Amara, as soon
as he is able to do so. He will then he in possession of a fuller knowledge of the local
situation than is now possible and we will then ask you for further orders. Nixon's force
being inadequate any advance beyond Amara would not be proposed by us.”
It will he observed from the above telegrams that Lord Crewe gave his
consent to the advance to Amara with some reluctance. His view was that
we were cliieflv concerned with the maintenance of a secure base at Basra
and the safety of our important interests in the oilfields. The India (Mice
had been constantly reminded of those interests by the Admiralty while it
was not without its own anxieties. Jt knew that in the circumstances of the
moment in Europe no military assistance could reasonably be expected front
the A ar Office. It recognised that India could send no further reinforce-
ifients, and though it was fully aware of the strategic and other advantages
of holding the Tigris Valley up to Amara, it was doubtful of our capacily
to do so if the Turks mustered in force to attack us there. It was felt,
however, that it was dilficult to reject the considered opinion of those on the
spot who were obviously in a better position to judge than we were of the
local conditions and the relative strength and value of the opposing forces.
The operations that ensued were carried out by General Townshend with
two. Brigades. On the brd June Amara was reached and the garrison
capita dated.
With the occupation of Amara and the submission of all the tribes in
the Karim valley, the gallant Mesopotamian Field Force might, without
on -its laurels during the blazing and enervating
Nixon, with the full support of the Government
inexpedient to remain inactive whilst any Turks:
were within striking .distance, he therefore next directed his activities
towards the Euphrates : side. ” There had been naval reconnaissances up the
Euphrates channels both from Basra and Kurna. which indicated an
eventual offensive movement in that direction, but the first positive
intimation on the subject received at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was the following • —
O *
reproach, have rested
summer, but General
India, deemed it
of
Tele-mim from V
?rov to Secretary of State for India, dated 13th June 1915.
£ ‘ Proposal by wire, from Nixon to secure Euphrates portion of Vilayet of Basra by
moving on N:is:riyeh with two Brigades. Concurring in this we propose to instruct him. as
si .m. as his preparations are complete, to proceed with this operation, which should have a
goo 1 effect on the tribes of the Euphrates. For the. success of this operation and maintenance
of his new position bis present force should be quite sufficient.”
Tin? vEw of the situation was accepted by Mr. Chamberlain, as though
the broken Turkish force at Nasiriyeh could scarcely b.e regarded as a menace
to us, it was thought that it might oiler a rallying point to Turkish reinforce-
ments from Baghdad, in which case Basra might possibly be again threatened
from the west, while unquestionably we could not expect the Arabs on the
Euphrates to side with us so long as they had a Turkish garrison in
their midst.
The Nasi riyeh operations were entrusted to Major-General Gorringe.
His instructions were to secure the occupation of Nasiriyeh and the country
in its vicinity. The operations commenced on the 27th June and ended with
the capture of Nasiriyeh on the 2.3th*July. During June, the Tigris column
in spite of the season had not been inactive and reconnaissances had been
pushed up the river towards El Gharbi. This gradual extension of the
sphere of our military operations, with its resultant attenuation of strength,
was regarded with some anxiety by the Secretary of State, more especially'
as it involved the withdrawal of troops from Basra and Ahwaz. General
Nixon too had reported (24th June) the concentration of Turkish troops'at
Kut-el-Amara and an offensive movement down the Tigris. The political
situation in Persia and at Aden was also very critical about this period,
and in view of all these circumstances Mr. Chamberlain considered