'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎389r] (787/1386)

17
V.— 'Why did ice attempt to hold Kat-el-Amara.
A minor ground of offence which has been raised against the Government
by a few critics is the strategy which tied General Townshend to Knt, after
his retreat, from Ctesiphon. The argument used has been that if he laid
retired steadilv down the Tigris to meet Ins approaching reinforcements,
the ultimate necessity for surrender would never have arisen and that the
combined force of three or four divisions, which General Nixon might then
have concentrated somewhere on the Tigris, would have been aide to resume
the offensive.
On the face of it the argument seems sound but that course was not
considered possible by the authorities on the spot,, a view which was
ultimately accepted by both the Government of India and the Secretary
of State.
Enquiries on this very point were made by the Secretary of State after
full discussion with the War Ol'lTce, and General Nixon had telegraphed on
the I 1 tli Deecndier :—
“ I fully considered the question of ahxndoning Kut. and Townshend and myself exchanged
views. It was decided from every point of view, military and political, that it was not advisable
, ;I . (.yen possible, looking to condition of tronns on their arrival there, to withdraw from Kut .
In.this connection see my telegram of 4th December:—‘ .... as far as the given time
‘ permits I nrn making Knt into as strong an entrenched camp as I can. Advanced guard of
‘ tlie enemy is about 10 miles away, and his main body some b miles further .... As 1
* .-eckon with certainty on being relieved by large forces arriving at Basra, I have shut myself
‘ up here. Instant rest is necessary owing to the state of extreme exhaustion of the men. It
• looked at one time as if the whole division would lie down and not be able to move, and i.
* was very anxious. Von dor (loltz’s advance down the Tigris will also be delayed by our
‘ lisine here, and you will have more time to concentrate the relieving force on the line Alt
• Gharbi Amaru.’ As Townshend is virtually surrounded there is no question of his
withdrawing.”
The real facts are that General Towmshend’s Division was worn out by
constant marching and lighting, and when it arrived at Kut on the
3rd December it sorely needed a rest after all its severe exertions. All the
supplies and munitions of the Gth Division had been accumulated in Kut.
The position was a strong an; 1 important one to hold. _ Strategically it arrested
the Turkish advance towards both Amara and Nasiriyeh, while tactically it
was almost unassailable as indeed was proved by the seige.
Moreover, had General Townshend continued his retirement there can be
little doubt that the Arabs, both along the Tigris and the Euphrates, would
have risen against us. Our communications would have been* everywhere
threatened and a situation would have arisen in December which might well
have been even more disastroi is than that produced by the surrender in
April. With the more complete knowledge that we* now have of the
conditions in December the more positively can we assert that the decision
to hold out at Kut was the right one at the moment. It fnve us time to
breathe, and but for the floods and atrocious weather conditions, combined
with certain grievous tactical errors, Kut should have been relieved in due
course, and at latest by the 8th March, when we lost a grand opportunity of
penetrating the Turkish lines on the right bank of the Tigris.
VL—77m Collapse of the administrative Arrangements of Force “ D."
Apart from the criticisms directed against the military policy of tbe
campaign and its strategical aspecis, a most serious attack is being made on
its administrative side. The terrible medical catastrophe, the lack of
shipping, the faulty transport arrangements, the want of railways, the
deficiencies in supplies, ordnance, ammunition, aeroplanes, and the neglect
of the many essentials of an army in the field, are all subjects of condemna
tion. We cannot deny the deplorable results that have been exposed, but
we can explain to a certain extent how they became inevitable. The brilliant
and unqualified successes of the Mesopotamian Eorce up to the autumn of 1915
had greatly relieved the situation both in the Middle East and on the Indian
Frontier so that the Government of India had for the time been enabled to
drain India of its military resources, both in men and material, to meet the
demands of the Imperial Government in Europe, in Egypt, in East Africa
and elsewhere. The ultimate result was that India was left with practically
no margin to meet unforeseen contingencies, and when the unforeseen did