'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎394r] (797/1386)

General Xixon to Secretary of State for LidX, l.ited 2oth July 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Luphrates Ijiue. l!i continuation of my telegram of 24-tli. In evidence of endurance
displayed by General Gorringe’s troops I would draw attention to the fact that they have
been fighting night and day with little or no intermission since 5th July up to to-day. Shade
temperature,^ 113 degrees, lias been common in an atmosphere of heaviest and closest
humidity. I lie exertions and hardships of trench warfare, where guns, ammunition, and
stores had to be moved without the help of animals, under such conditions are difficult
authentically to describe, twenty days of such work, culminating in an attack on a series ef
entrenched positions form a test the severity of which it would be difficult to over
estimate.
Tigris Line. There continues to bo some activity on part of enemy, mainly hostile tribes
men, around Kumait area Unconfirmed report that five Turkish guns had been advanced to
Ali-ash-Sharqi on 23rd. 7th Rajputs proceeded to Kama from Basra, 24th.
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 14/A September 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
| Headquarters, Sixth Division, reached Sheikh Sand 14th; no enemy there. General
Officer Commanding Sixth Division made aeroplane reconnaissance of Sinn position without
definite result. Reconnaissance by gunboats supported by infantry being carried out 15th.
General Headquarters remain at Amara for the present.
u
General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated Voth September 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Tigris line. Headquarters, 6th Division, reached Abu Rummanah 15th, six miles from
Sinn position. Result of to-day’s naval reconnaissance tends to show that Turks hold position
in strength. Ships are being returned to Amara to fetch up 63rd and Howitzer Batteries and
fui thei supplies. 1 his will take about a week. Further reconnaissance being made
16th. Two machines have been seriously damaged by bid landing, wind has been unfavour
able. Steps being taken to replace them from Basra. Am in communication by land line
and wireless with Abu.
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 4'/i October 1915.
/, (Telegraphic.)
V Private. My telegram of to-day about Nixon’s plans. Your private letter of 10th
September seems to render it imperative to stop Nixon’s further advance. I shall be grateful
for early communication of your views.
aerv
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General Nixon to Secretary of State for India, dated 4//i OoL^er 1915.
I \ | i 1
Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 5 th October 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Private. My private telegram of 4th instant. Nixon’s advance. Cabinet, to whom
position was reported yesterday, decided to appoint Committee of General Staff, Admiralty,
foreign and India Offices to consider in all its aspects possibility and policy of advance on
Baghdad. Political reasons were thought to make occupation desirable as isolatino- Germans
m 1 ersia, if forces available are sufficient to take and hold the place. Barrow thinks we
miglR be able to capture Baghdad, but that forces weakened by further losses would be
insufficient both to hold it securely against counter attack and to maintain communications.
Kitchener can hold out no hope of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt. Let me know your
views. J
Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 12th October 1915.
Private. My private telegram of the 9th instant. Reinforcements for Nixon. Kitchener
.s proposing to Sir John French removal of Indian Infantry from France to Egypt He
cannot give me definite answer till reply is received. 1 shall do my utmost to secure complete
Division for Mesopotamia. I do not understand why Nixon asks for a white cavalry regiment.
I do not think one is available, and my advisers consider Indian cavalry more suitable.
V
V
_ From Viceroy, 7th October 1915.
Private. Your private telegram of the 5th instant. Sir John Nixon’s plans. Com rnander-
i-Chief agrees with view contained in my private telegram of yesterday that it would be
unwise to occupy Baghdad with our present forces. As regards* suggested employment of
Japanese troops, I am not enthusiastic over the idea, and feel there are very grave objections
on the ground of prestige and popular sentiment in the East. Moreover, stringent conditions
would be essential if they were employed in Mesopotamia. But I feel strongly that wo have
got to win this war, and that difficulties and existing prejudices may have to give way to
attainment of this object. M hat I would greitly prefer is that our own troops in Egypt should
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