'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎399r] (807/1386)

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magnitude oC these particular risks. , I have, however, pointed out Ho
Kilchener that this plan involves tl e abandonment of the large loan of
oOicers to which you have agreed, as they would be needed for their own
units. This of course is a purelv British argument. Ckewe.
Ab /6.
Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State,
dated ISth September 1914.
Private. Troops from India. I have just received your private telegram
of yesterday which has filled me with concern. Although 1 have practical!}
met all the demands that have been made upon me even at some risk, there
jk, 1 am sure vou will agree, a limit beyond which risk becomes a seiious
danger. That* limit is now very nearly reached. I will now give you my
personal opinion on Kitchener's proposition before consulting my military
advisers who have at present no knowledge of these proposals.
Under no circumstances could I agree to any weakening of first, -second,
and fourth divisions in numbers (of) personnel or material. It is absolutely
essential that they should be maintained intact in view of uncertainty of
possible developments in Afghanistan during course of war, and of attitude
of tribes. Only vesterday I received a report of a Mahsud jirga being held
at which it was stated that forces on the frontier had been weakened and an
attack was advocated on the Wana Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. . No decision was taken owing
to absence of one of leaders. This is an example of inflammatory material
that we have on the frontier with which it is necessary to have an efficient
and adequate force to deal. The three divisions are only sufficient to form a.
containing force over so long a frontier, and would be insufficient for leprisals
or an incursion into hostile territory. Aly impression is that Com man der-m-
Ohief will also never agree to any weakening of these frontier divisions.
As regards forces detailed for internal defence my first impiession is that
1 would*try withdrawal of the British regiments, provided that with the
British regiments Indian regiments were taken battalion foi battalion, and
that two territorial regiments were substituted for each pair of British and
Indian battalions thus withdrawn. In this manner internal security could
be maintained, and several divisions of trained tioops could be obtained foi
service in Europe. .
These are my ideas which 1 give you at once, without prejudice to the
opinion of my military advisers, who have not yet been consulted, and to
whose views 1 must naturally give weight that is due.
Afo /y.
Telegram from 1 iceroy to Secretary of State, dated \Jlh September 1914.
Private, kiy private telegram of yesterday. On further consideration 1
am of opinion that, provided an Indian battalion is withdrawn to Europe or
elsewhere simultaneously with a British battalion, I could manage safely foi
internal defence with a smaller proportion of territorial battalions than I said
in mv telegram of yesterday. This is without consultation of Commander-
m-eiurf., ° Ab/s.
Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated IVth September 1914.
Private. Your two private telegrams received yesterday and to-day.
Indian troops. 1 hope it may be possible to devise an arrangement on the
lines you suggest. It would be a further magnificent contnbution from
India I shall await a formal communication from you before discussing
subject further with War Office. At present 1 have only a private letter
from Kitchener.—CuE\vE.
Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated VHh September 1914.
Private, hollowing from Prime Minister I.attach great importance
to Kitchener’s request for early exchange of India s icgular battalions fc.
Territorials. Most important that high reputation won by our regular troops
with Sir J French should be maintained, and at this stage of the war a huq e
i Enforcement of them mav prove decisive. Matter very urgent. -Asquith. ’