'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎401r] (811/1386)

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most of their ongimil functions and relegated to the status of Inspeetoiatos
responsible only for discipline, inspections, training and minor promotions.
It may perhaps be necessary to explain that up to 1892 the Indian Army
-was organised under the archaic and decrepit Presidential system. In that
year, with the full concurrence of Lord Roberts, then Commander-in-Ohiei,
the Four Army Commands System was introduced with a special view to
the decentralisation of army business. This survived only till 1907, when
it was swept away by Lord Kitchener, the so-called “ Commands being
replaced • by two Army Commanders with greatly restricted duties as
already described. I had the honour and the misfortune to till one of these
thankless posts lor four years, so I know how unprofitable tlje} T were in the
public sense ; but I also know how by a stroke of the pen they can at once,
without any undue interference with the existing organization, be made
more generally useful and thus possibly help to relieve the congestion of
business at Headquarters.
I would place on them not only the inspection of troops but also the
inspection of stations, departments, and hospitals. They should be the argus-
eyed inspectors of the CoTnmander-in-Chief, and many minor matters of
administration which now find their way to Simla might be 'promptly
disposed of by them in direct communication with the Divisional
Commanders. The only difficulty is the crucial one whether Simla will
consent to relax itfr; present feeble grip on a highly centralised system.
I do not like my first proposal. It is contrary to human nature ; but
something must be done, and, short of recalling the Commander-iu-Chief, 1
see no other way out of the difficulty. The business of the Indian Army
cannot be efficiently carried on as things now are, and it is already tending
to drift unduly under War Cilice control, a consummation which I regard as
both dangerous and unworkable. I cannot think it sound policy even in
war to place military operations in Asia and the practical control of that
most delicate and complex instrument, the Indian Army, under an Army
administration deviated to deal with totally different conditions and devoid
of all sympathy with its ideas. Moreover, by so doing, we undermine the
prestige and authority of the Viceroy at a time when so much depends
thereon. It is true that Mesopotamia points to the breakdown of Indian
Army administration, and makes it an easy task for the critic to depreciate
everything Indian, but I would point out three things. Firstly, that the
Army organisation which has failed is a new-fangled one based on the
Fnnli.di system. Secoiid^ that even the existing system has surpassed all
expectations by sending more than a hundred thousand men overseas in the
service of the Fmpire, and that it is largely owing to this very fact that it
has failed in Mesopotamia. Finally, that the failure is—and t say it with
professional sorrow—largely due to the imprudence or the blunders of the
C<merals in actual command. In the late Victorian period the Indian Army
led the way. Its officers felt themselves second to none and they were
proud of their men. To-day, I regret to say that I hear on all sides that the
oflu-ers are discontented and disheartened ; their confidence is shaken—not
in their men, who have never fought and died more gloriously—but in the
Army administration, in the way they have been handled in action, and
above all in the scant recognition they have received.