'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎407r] (824/1386)

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1 he posit ion was a strong and important one to hold. Strategically it arrested
the Turkish advance towards both Amara and Nasiriyeh, while tactically it
"ups almost unassailable, as indeed Avas proved bv the seige.
; Moreover, had General Townshpnd continued his retirement there can be
little doubt that the Arabs, both along the Tigris and the Euphrates, would
hy,ve risen against us. Our communications would have been everywhere
threatened and a situation would have arisen in December which might well
have been even more disastrous than that produced by the surrender in
April. With the more complete knowledge that we now have of the
conditions in December the more positively can we assert that the decision
to hold out at Kut was the right one at the moment. It gave us time'do
breathe, and but for the Hoods and atrocious weather conditions, combined
with certain grievous tactical errors, Kut should have been relieved in due
course, and at latest by the 8 th March, when we appear to have lost a grand
upportunity of penetrating the Turkish lines on the right bank of the
Tigris.
(f)—.77m Collapse vf the Adminidrctive A rraiujcmcnt?.
r, 72, The biiiliant and uncjualihed successes<>f the Mesopotamian Force up
to the autumn of Dlto had greatly relieved the situation, both on the Middlu
East, and on the Indian Frontier, so that the Government of India had for
the time been enabled to drain India of its military resources, both in men
and material, to meet the demands of the Imperial Government in Europe,
m Egypt, in East Africa, and elsewhere. The ultimate result was that
India was left with practically no margin to meet unforeseen eontingenme:
and when the unforeseen did occur, India found herself without doctors,
without medical equipment, without needful supplies and land transport.
I have had prepared statements showing
(i) The contributions made by India in personnel and war material.
(ii; The demands made on England by the Government of India i;i
connection with Mesopotamia and the action taken thereon.
The Director-General of Stores is also preparing a statement showing ihe
steps taken by his department.
Our shortcomings are now painfully obvious, but they did not become
so till the necessity for reinforcing General Nixon arose. Whatever short
comings there may have been, real failure only occurred after the battle of
Ctesiphon.
It must be borne in mind that there was no intention on the part of tin*
Government to advance beyond the Basra Yilayat till October 1915, and,
indeed, definite sanction for that operation was only given on the 23rd of thaj
month. Till we left Kurna at the very end of May 1915 the need for river
shipping on a lairfc scale had not arisen. So long as our operations were
conlined to the Shatt-el-Arab and the Karun, our resources in this respect,
as well as our medical requirements, appear to have been adequate.
General Barrett had been generally satisfied, as an advance was not con
templated beyond Kurna, to which point light draught Gulf steamers could
ascend. Ilis evidence on this point has been communicated to the Vincent-
Bingley Commission. The insufficiency of the medical arrangements began
to present itself after the battles round Shaiba (11 th to 14th April 1915),
but it wiT be well to await the Report of the above Commission on tins
point as well as the evidence of witnesses who are acquainted with the
subject.
Till the summer of 1915 no adverse reports regarding either medical
arrangements or river transport had been communicated to the Secretary
of State. On the 9th October Mr. Chamberlain made special enquiries
regarding the health of the troops. The reply was satisfactory. Again
after Ctesipbon there was some anxiety, but General Nixon’s telegram of the
7th December (page 41 of precis) allayed all fears at the time. A little later,
owing to private reports the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy
for information. Tie replied on the 24tli December by telegraph, but still
there was no sign of the impending collapse. The first warning note was
a telegram from General Nixon, dated 10th January 1916 :—
‘•The deficiency of river-craft, to which f. have so often referred, renders o e 'adt of JfcfA
evacuating the wounded intensely difficult. These amount to about 3,000.”