'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎413r] (836/1386)

protection of pipe-lme is concerned, it is impossible to take offensive, action vrith onr small
- m : e ! ana reinforcements we can send from India would suffice efther for this or to render
position, at Basra sate. We regard it as essential that Basra should receive at least another
complete division, and this we cannot provide. If,' therefore, position in Mesopotamia is to be
made secure, this must be done by sending troops from elsewhere than India itself. We are
aware or strong objections of War Office to reducing the forces either in Egvpt or East Africa
a. present time but having regard to fact that a disaster in Mesopotamia must inevitablv
bnng ir, ;o ^e .ielc against us both Persia and Afghanistan with the frontier tribes, and may
seriously aftect our Mussulman population and Mussulman troops, we consider that this
danger justifies our pressing for a reconsideration of attitude of War Office. We also feel that
ndia has a first claim on her own troops when they are required to avert a danger which is
threatening her security. We therefore urge most strongly that a complete division, or its
equivalent, of Indian troops should he at once returned to us, whether these are drawn from
hg.vpt or hast A Inca. We entirely agree,that prompt action is most necessary. Situation
at Aden is also unsatisfactory. We are not strong enough there to do more "than protect
settlement itself, and we cannot send any troops to help tribes who are nominally under our
protection to defend themselves against the Turks, who have invaded the Protectorate
No. 89 A
Secretnry of State for India to Viceroy, dated 19th February 1915.
M'litary situation. Your official telegram of Kith February (rfde No. 83 B)
W ar Office agree that it is important to complete second division in Mesopotamia as soon as
possible, owing to serious effect in India of any failure there. They urge that you -should
lake temporary risk of leaving internal defence force below due strength for period, which
ought to be Short, before at any rate one brigade can be returned from Egypt. I ara-ee that
a ll indications now point to abandonment of serious attack on Panal. so that you should receive
ilns one brigade very soo.l, though War Office demand fuller confirmation of Turkish
retirement before sending it. You will understand that I cannot express decisive opinion as
to exact risk you ought to take m India,, though I am anxious about position in Mesopotamia
and feel confident you aviII strengthen force there as far as you dare. Value of reinforcement
is strikingly shown m S-ir P. Cox’s telegram, :I05 B. of 18th February. Meanwhile 1
understand from kitchener that he is replacing the Territorial battalion which von sent to
Singapore.. lie \\ ar Office consider the Aden posit-ion lass urgent, but 1 take care that it is
borne in mind.
No. 91 A Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 2\d Fed, vary 1915.
Private. Your private telegram of the 19th instant. Military situation.
t am glad that War Office now recognise serious effects' in India of any failure in
Mesopotamia, At. present we have there four brigades of infantry, and apparently the War
Offic i urge that we should at once scud two more brigades to Basra so as to complete the
iorce in Mesopotamia to two divisions of infantry, taking our risks here meanwhile. [ io r ee
that all indications point to the abandonment of serious attack on the Canal. Even should
the threat there be serious, I understand that Egypt now contains 40,000 Colonial troops and
a division of Territorials, in addition to the infantry portion of two Indian divisions. Vs
compared to our position at Basra the Egyptian position can do (? without) one complete
O' division) sal ely. Recent happenings m the 130th Baluchis and at Singapore seem to show
that we must not trust our Musalman troops too far, that even in India they m&y decline to
tight their oo-rehgionists, and that it is unlikely that trans-frontier men would be much use
to us if Afghanistan and the tribes went wrong. On the other hand we cannot send troops of
tjns class to Mesopotamia, where they might be a burden rather than a help to Barrett
Should we send Indian troops or Territorials or both to Basra, we add much to the relative
strength of the Mohamedan troops iu India. We have already taken one brigade off our
frontier, and have thus already infringed the important and necessary principle we have
adopted of maintaining three divisions on the frontier intact. The Commander-in-Chief and
1 only agreed to this under great stress. In view of the general situation on the frontier we
do not think ; hat two divisions there sufficient, and the internal situation created by risino-
price of foods, uifs and sinister appearance of affairs in the Punjab, where Lieutenant-Governor
thought it nee* saary yesterday to warn all stations to be prepared for trouble amongst the
troops last night, i think it would be madness to take any further risks. The minimum we
now require is one brigade t4 complete the depleted Quetta division and two brigades to
reinforce Basra. Even then Mesopotamia will be lamentably and dangerously in want of
more artmery. At the same time Aden is greatly in need of troops, and without the return
ot a fourth brigade we have no troops to meet an emergency. The Comn a ider-in-Chief h s
seen this telegram and entirely concurs.
No. 99 A Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, dated 3rd March 1915.
(Telegraphic.)
Your telegram of the 23rd ultimo (ride No. 94). We agree that the position of
Force 4 D gives cause for great anxiety and that we may be faced shortly with a serious
attack on Basra.
‘ is difficult to obtain reliable information as to distribution of Turkish forces but we
hear of at least three divisions (other than the 35th) which cannot be precisely loc’ated and
are reported to bo destined for Mesopotamia. If this be so the enemy might attack Basra via
the Euphrates with forces considerably superior to ours and with'a large number of Arab
auxiliaries and this might happen within the next month or six weeks. The rise of the Tigris
above Kurna seems likely to prevent active operations by either side on that river *and
MS 256 C