'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎433r] (876/1386)

9
These considerations taken separately would appear to have fully justified'
at the time the course recommended by the Government of India and accepted
by the Secretary of State.
(d)— Why we went to Cicsiphon.
IS. The phase of the Mesopotamian campaign which ended at Ctesiphon
■nn tnndlv the oim winch has excited, the most iiilen?*t mul ihe.
cnticism. As already shown, when we advanced from Kurna the initiative
passed from the Secretary of State to the Government of India; similarly,
after the battle of Kut-el-Amara the initiative passed from the Government
of India to the General in Command.
19. Kut-el-Amara was captured on the 29th September. Four days later
The head of the pursuit had reached half way to Aziziyah. On the same
day (3rd October) General Nixon telegraphed, reporting various movements
-and details. His telegram juihImi! rtlnn : also specifically added: —
“ [ consider I am strong enouah to open road to Baghdad* and with tins intention I propose
to concentrate at Aziziyah. ( v y£ Q p 3]_ 0 f precis)
* 1 V * -ir i *
i ill i' tT'Milj ilniiiiiiiMn 'n Tiytiin irnnr'n r L -irni i i— If' n
i mHit
il'iiry poiMi irf■
fpm.
On the 4th October ic* Safi
submitted a Minute to the
Secretary of State, which is quoted at .pages 31-32 of the precis, and to
which I would draw the attention of the Committee, as it states, I believe
' correctly, not only my own views, but those of the Secretary of State on the
mentioned. On that same evening the Secretary of State telegraphed
• 1 ellowsto~tIie~\ icere^-r ’"~~
p a As it appears that owing to difficulties of navigation, there is now little chance of
overtaking and breaking up the retreating Turks, there is no object in. pursuing them any
further, and so imder these circumstances I shall be glad to learn what Nixon s present
intentions are. Subject to what may occur in Baghdad and elsewhere and to any proposal
you in ly now recommend, the orders which my telegrams of 24th April and 6th August conveyed
to you are still in force. Kindly send me by telegram au estimate of what you consider to be
‘ the present strength in Mesopotamia of the enemy.”
The orders above referred to limited the operations to the Basra Vi lay at.
A bout the itamn ,l,>.i.rmik, iliL. xj r witpiwcxl*
-jry -Utr Gujww 0lli-ce. (Wtde pffgf- : 32 ^ precis-.)
The history of what followed between the 5th October and the 21st October
•is given as far as possible in narrative form at pages 33-38 of the precis.
T "would particularly call attention to the proceedings of the Inter
departmental Committee (pages 35-56 of precis). The final decision was
taken at a war committee of the Cabinet held on the 23rd October, and on
that date the Secretary of State telegraphed the decision to the Viceroy. In
that fateful telegram it was expressly stated that “Nixon may march on
Baghdad if he is satisfied that the troops he has are enough for the
purpose."
/
form
the
urmr
.“'Dhis telegram was advisably framed in a permissive
in case General Ilison should have received information in
interval r so altering the military situation,that he might wish
to modify his plans
20. On the 22 nd November was fought the battle of Ctesiphon, which,
though a tactical victory, unhappily proved a strategical defeat, and on the
25tlvafter the wounded had all been removed, the retreat to Kut-el-Amara
menced.
The precis shows how step by step^ th e policy of the advance on B aghdad
by the fgovernment^was in reality inexorably shaped by
the force of circumstance^
— agd though nothing can justify failure, it may at least
be urged in favour of General Nixon’s idea of, .advancino- to Baghdad
that a Turkish offensive in or through Vcrsui nupofsi ble °if we
could take and hold that ...position. At the time anarchy prevailed
throughout Persia, and German intrigues were rampant, so that had
* The italics were not in the original telegram, but as this is the first definite susre-estmn _ / a
of going on to Baghdad, attention is called to it. ggest.cn/ CCrfJff/aZM**?
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