'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎458r] (926/1386)

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•FhvTrr-Secretan) of State to Viceroy,fl9lh February 1915. /f^/^
Private. Military situation. \our official telegram oi Uitli Pebruarv^
War Office agree that it is imports.rfl to cofilptet^ seeDfTd iriryi'Sfefi iii
Mesopotamia as soon as possible, owing to serious effect in I ndia of anj
failure there. They urge that you should take temporary risk of leaving
internal defence force below due strength for period, which ought to be
short before at any rate one brigade can be returned from h-gypt. ^ f agree
that all indications now point to abandonment of serious attack on C anal, so
that you should receive this one brigade very soon, though W ar Office demand
fuller confirmation of Turkish retirement before sending it. 5ou will
understand that 1 cannot express decisive opinion as to exact risk you ought
to take in India, though 1 am anxious about position in Mesopotamia, and
feel confident you will strengthen force there as far as you dare. Value of
reinforcement is strikingly shown in Sir P. Cox s telegram, 305 B. of
18th February. Meanwhile 1 understand from Kitchener that he is
replacing the Territorial battalion which you sent to Singapore. The War
Office consider the Aden position less urgent, but I take care that it is
borne in mind.
K A A ' »
‘ ^ • ^Fj‘x)m Viceroy. 21st February 1915.
Private. Your private telegram of the 19th instant. Military situation.
1 am glad that War Office now recognise serious effects in India of any
failure in Mesopotamia. At present we have there four brigades of infantry
and apparently the W ar Office urge that we should at once send two more
brigades to Basra so as to complete the force in Mesopotamia to two divisions
of infantry, taking our risks here meanwhile. 1 agree that all indications
point to the abandonment of serious attack on the Canal. Fven should the
threat there be serious 1 understand that Egypt now contains 40,000 Colonial
troops and a division of Terri tori als^in addition to the infantry portion of two
Indian divisions. As compared to our position at Basra the Egyptian position
can do (? without) one complete (? division) safely. Recent happenings in the
130th Baluchis and at Singapore seem to show that we must not trust our
Musalman troops too far, that even in India they may decline to fight their
co-religionists, and that it is unlikely that trans-frontier men would be much
use to us if Afghanistan and the tribes went wrong. On ihe other hand we
cannot send troops of this class to Mesopotamia, where they might be a
burden rather than a help to Barrett. Should we send Indian troops or
Territorials or both to Basra we add much to the relative strength of the
Mohamedan troops in India. W e have already taken one brigade off our
frontier, and have thus already infringed the important and necessary
principle we have adopted of maintaining three divisions on the frontier
intact. The Commander-in-Chief and I only agreed to this under great
stress. In view of the general situation on the frontier we do not think that
two divisions there sufficient, and the internal situation created by rising
price of foodstuffs and sinister appearance of affairs in the Punjab, where
Lieutenant-Governor thought it necessary yesterday to warn all stations to
be prepared for trouble amongst the troops last night, I think it would be
madness to take any further risks. The minimum we now require is one
brigade to complete the depleted Quetta division and two brigades to
reinforce Basra. Even then Mesopotamia will be lamentably and dangerously
in want of more artillery. At the same time Aden is greatly in need of
troops, and without the return of a fourth brigade we have no troops to meet
an emergency. The Commander-in-Chief has seen this telegram and entirely
concurs.