File 1341/1921 Pt 1 'Khorassan Intelligence Summaries 1921-1922' [‎361v] (370/1080)

The same informant says that the . Afghan frontier^ post of Chahildukh-
tpran has been moved seven versts within the Bolsheviks’ territory to a place
called Baighirz. There is nothing as yet to confirm this.
Bokhara. The embankment and bridges between Samsun and Karkicha
on the Karshi-Karki railway were totally washed away in the course of the
summer inundations of the Amu Darya but work has been resumed again.
An arrival in Meshed from Karki, a merchant of. some standing, stated
that Bolshevik officers there were saying that 30,000 rifles with ammunition
and seven aeroplanes had been sold to the Afghans. The aeroplanes were to be
delivered to Kushk and Termez and out of the number four were to go to Kabul
and three to Afghan Turkestan. Another, a man from. Charjui, testifies to
havino- seen seven to eight aeroplanes loaded at Charjui on to steamers and
sent to Termez. Bis credibility has not been yet established and there is a
chance of his having heard the information of the merchant and elaborated it.
There is a revival of lawlessness in Bokhara, but whether the outlaws are
merelv robbers or .organized bodies operating against the Bolshevik occupation
of the"conn try is not yet certain. In these days none but those with access to
arsenals, to other sources of supply of munitions, or to. support from neigh-
bourin^ States, can make war against a country able to initiate these resources.
Certainly Bokhara is not in that position, and it may be remembered how
much her hopes of Afghan support in 1920 were justified. That support took
the form of a medieval tribute of five brass guns on elephants.
It is incontestable that there is much discontent with, even hatred of, the
Bolsheviks in Bokhara, that hatred being engendered by the drain of food pro
ducts to the famine areas and for the rationing of the Bed Army, to say nothing
of the realization of the loss of independence. Nevertheless, the subject races
of Bussia cannot fight their suzerain. They are unable to resist that suzerainty
by political agitation like others do elsewhere in the world, for any attempt
thereat leads to speedy a.-rest and an unrecorded execution of the principals,
The whole of Central Asia that was Bussian w ill remain Bussian so long as the
Central Government in Moscow intends it shall, however much artificial condi
tions of independent existence are allowed to masquerade as “autonomy within
the Soviet Republic ”. A dissolution of that hegemony can only occur upon
political disruption at Moscow and disruption at Moscow will only be a change
over from one dominant party to another with, possibly, an interregnum of
anarchy. In that interregnum the Central Asian States may make a feeble
attempt at self-assertion but such must in the nature of things be short-lived.
Ferghana .—We see something of continued resistance to the Government
in Ferghana which w r ould rather seem to contradict the above assertion, and
there is no doubt that the Soviet Republic is embarrassed by the irreconcilable
attitude of Sher Muhammad Khan, ¥urgash, Mohiudin, and other Basmach
leaders. It is very probable that that embarrassment is due not to the rebellion
itself but to the contributory causes of on the one hand, economic stringency
which makes it impossible to concentrate troops and to maintain them on
campaign and, on the other hand, to the moral embarrassment the Soviet
Government must feel at their being expected to give effect to their promises
of autonomy for Ferghana, which autonomy the Basmach leaders demand
must be de jacto and not a euphemism for subservience to Moscow.
Basmachism will end with the ability of the Government to take the field but
with its destruction will come a revelation of how little “ autonomy within the
Soviet Republic” means.
Khiva.— There was a gradual concentration of troops in Khiva during
November, and at the time of the last report some 5,000 were concentrated
there. The reason for this has been the increased activity of the Yomuds who
lately attacked Khiva but were driven off with loss, it being rumoured that
Juneid Khan was among the wounded. Thirty Yomuds were captured and
four of them publicly shot. It was believed that a column would follow up
Juneid Khan, operations being possible in the Qum in winter,the snowmaking
up for a deficiency of wells.
Economic .—Conditions of scarcity show no improvement and more thaii
one witness testifies to famine refugees subsisting on the corpses of their