File 2879/1919 Pt 1 ‘MESOPOTAMIA Kurdistan: The Suleimanieh Outbreak’ [‎235r] (57/156)

smemmaum
From Political, Baghdad, 29th August 1910.
(Copy by post (? India).)
(Received 30th, 10.45 a.m.)
Priority A.
10081. Your telegram of 22nd August. Attitude
Kurdistan.
For position of previous outbreak see page 30 of Mesopotamian Diaries for
February-March, para. 3c. See also my telegram 5867 of 25th May and my telegram
9859, 23rd August, which crossed your telegram under reply.
Present position is not as suggested in your telegram. Fact that order was
Restored by military authorities within one month and that normal civil adminis
tration was re-established within three months of rising of Sheikh Mahmoud who at the
(corrupt group) time succeeded in concentrating more than 500 n/en out of a potentiality
of many thousands is, 1 think, proof that present regime is welcomed by the majority
of the inhabitants. See also General, Baghdad, telegrams X. 7196, 5 th July, and
X. 7301, Pud August.
We are governing Southern Kurdistan not by force but consent, but no
Government in these days can carry on without force behind it.
2 . Idea embodied in President Wilson’s 14 points and confirmed in Anglo-
French declaration of 8 th A T ovember of substituting nationality, religion or race as
basis of Government in Middle East in lieu of “ability and power to govern,”
has aroused dormant animosities of past hundred years.
Coming as it did on top of acute misery arising out of war, it was eagerly
adopted by every race and sect and variously interpreted according to their racial
idiosyncrasies.
Already reaction is visible. Acute dissensions among political parties in
Palestine and Syria are first signs of it on the Arab side.
At Suleimaniyah tide has already turned. After a brief taste of Nationalist
anarchy they have no desire to try it again. Task of organising a civil adminis
tration on Kurdish lines, with Kurdish officials under effective British supervision, is
proceeding well. Insistent demand of the people is for more British supervision,
which lack of officers prevents me supplying ; country and its revenues must sutler
accordingly. Even this year’s estimated revenue exceeds estimated expenditure in
Division by 20,000L and next year it should be much better.
This fact alone differentia’tes Suleimaniyeh Division from ordinary frontier district
and from rest of Kurdistan. This Division has always been regarded by Turks as
part of Mesopotamia; it was so classified in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and
geographically and strategically it belongs to Mesopotamia not to Kurdistan.
Unrest is prevalent everywhere, but I am confident if we can hold on a year
or two longer and steer steady course on present lines, we shall come into smoother
waters.
Sheikh Mahmud’s rising has been regarded as test in all Northern Mesopotamia
of our power to maintain order and enforce justice in face of widespread popular
belief that all troops had gone.
Railway and roads are powerful civilising factors, and it is to this aspect of their
construction, rather than to their strategical value, that I look for results in Southern
Kurdistan.
Whatever may be the eventual decision with regard to Rowanduz (from which
we have at present withdrawn), we cannot afford to leave Suleimaniyah to its own
devices. Disorderly element would quickly get the upper hand and we should require
a larger (? force) at Kirkuk, Kifri and (? Erbil) than we now have at or near
Suleimaniyah.