'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎227r] (452/501)

5
[448 c—1] c
already stated, not yet been finally settled, a similar administration has been extended
of the Sulaimani division also. Order is preserved and elections are proceeding.
The reoccupation of Rowanduz has proved conclusively, in the opinion of the Air
Officer Commanding, with which I concur, its value in the maintenance of stability in
Southern Kurdistan. To this point 1 shall have occasion to refer in greater detail
under section III. It is sufficient to observe here that, since a loose form of administra
tion by the Irak Government was restored over the Kurdish areas, and since those
areas have been untroubled by the intrusion of Turkish irregulars and adventurers,
there has been no sign of discontent with present conditions. If in the beginning of the
year there was anxiety lest Sheikh Mahmud of Sulaimani should attempt a raid on
the plains of Kirkuk, his powers in that direction have during the last few months
been nil. The Irak Government has been able to regard his restless activities with
comparative equanimity, nor has he presented any obstacle to the continued reduction
of the garrison in Kirkuk, which has now been left to the protection of the levies.
Other considerations must be mentioned with respect to the Mosul kadhas. With
the responsibilities of His Majesty’s Government towards the Assyrian community
settled in their limits I shall deal fully in the next section ; but the Yazidis of Sinjar
and the northern kadhas must not be omitted, nor the large Arab tribal population of
Tall Afar Kadha, where the Turkomans are confined to the village itself. The Y azidis
were subject to bitter oppression under the Ottoman regime on account of their
peculiar, if harmless, tenets. The fear of massacre was always before their eyes, and,
like the Christians and Jews of Mosul, they would regard any Government as preferable
to that of the Turks. No paper safeguards which could be devised would allay their
justifiable alarm. . .
To sum up, it is my considered opinion that the retrocession to Turkey of
Southern Kurdistan, whether Tall Afar and Sinjar are retained or not, presents even
greater disadvantages than that of Mosul Vilayet as a whole, nor is there a single
argument in its favour. The honour of the Irak Government might be momentarily
preserved by the retention of the Arab population of Mosul town and district. But the
position could not be maintained without a military effort, which must sap the strength
of Irak, nor could the safety of Mosul at any time be guaranteed. It is true that the
Irak Government may, when deprived in the future of the support of the British forces,
be unable regularly to maintain complete military control of these mountainous Kurdish
areas, and that they may be subject to disturbance by the incursion of irregular
Turkish bands, which can be disavowed by the Turkish Government. This will always
be a danger. But for so long as it is formally recognised that these areas lie within
the Irak boundary, regular Turkish forces cannot enter them except by an act of war,
and the temperament of the mountain K urds is such that, without the close proximity
and support of regular troops upon their own side, they will not ordinarily indulge in a
prolonged or serious offensive nor trust themselves to the plains. The further back,
therefore, that the Turkish boundary can be thrown from the Mosul plains the safer
will those plains remain.
C .—Detailed Examination of the Northern Frontier Line.
4 In my telegram dated the 4 th September, 1923, 1 informed your Grace that my
proposals would slightly modify, by the light of more exact information, those put
forward in Sir Percy Cox’s despatch dated the 9th December, 1921. The arguments
urged in that despatch are as cogent as they were at the time when it was written,
indeed, they have been further enhanced by subsequent events. Before, however,
entering on this theme I must draw attention to corrections in the map attached to the
despatch.
I .—Errors in Maps attached to Sir Percy Cox's Despatch.
Sir Percy Cox pointed out in his despatch that the Sevres 1 reaty line was
apparentlv based upon the chain-dotted line in the obsolete million sheet, lo illustrate
his proposals, Sir Percy Cox appended to his despatch a photographic copy of the
“ Maunsell” sheets containing the areas under reference. Extension of survey work
and increased knowledge of the topography and history of these areas have now revealed
serious errors in these sheets, which were to some extent rectified in the Rough
Sketch Map of the Nerva and Raikan Districts” attached to Appendix 111 of Sir
Percy Cox’s despatch. Instances of incorrect mapping are also to be found in
connection with the Hazil and Khabur valleys. Further, the longitude of Zakhio and
Amadia and of points between and about these centres is shown in these maps as

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎227r] (452/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎227r] (452/501)

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