File 36/1919 Pt 3 ‘KURDISTAN POLICY & SITUATION’ [‎42v] (93/608)

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nir, he did not think that any number of troops would be able to prevent it. The
suppression of internal disorder was, lie considered, already the duty of the Air force. r j
As Sir P. Cox himself suggested, the military position in Iraq would be undoubted! A
stronger when the Air Force assumed command, as by that time the local forces would
have had training and experience. At the same time it had to be recognised th:>|, +H
whole scheme of air control in Iraq was based upon the supposition that there wi
be no external attack in force. The probability of a serious attack by the lurks
seemed very remote under the present conditions.
Mr. Bullard said that any threat of invasion would probably be accompanied by
internal disorder in Kurdistan. The two questions could not really be considered
separately.
Colonel Meinertzhagen pointed out that both questions really turned on the larger
one of whether the General Staff would be prepared, in certain eventualities, to send
an expeditionary force to Iraq. This was a Cabinet question.
The Chairman said that the only answer that could be sent appeared to be that
His Majesty’s Government were prepared to do their best with the forces at their
disposal and with the help of the Arab army and levies, but that no reinforcements
could be expected from overseas. The real issue appeared to him to be that of future
relations with the Nationalist Turks. The only enemy against whom defence would he
needed was the Turk. If His Majesty’s Government were not prepared to delend
Feisal against his only enemy, were they prepared to make peace with that enemy?
If not able to make peace themselves, were they prepared to allow Feisal to make
peace on his own account ? He understood that this question was under consideration
by the Cabinet. At present the situation seemed to be that we wmuld not defend him,
could not make peace with his enemy and would not let him make peace himself.
Mr. Lindsay informed the Committee of the present state of the negotiations with
M. Gounaris with a view to Allied mediation, and indicated that the position was not
entirely hopeless. Much depended on the extent to which the three Allies could make
their views coincide and bring united pressure to bear on the Turks. In view of the
journey to W ashington of M. Briand, he did not think any immediate decision by them
likely. Subject to the views of the War Office representatives, he doubted whether
the Turks would be likely to move anything more than a very small force from the
Greeks to the Iraq frontier just now.
It was decided —
That Sir F. Cox might be informed, with regard to questions 1 and 2 :—
J hat the War Office were of opinion that it would not be possible, with th<
reduced garrison laid down for Iraq, either to repel external attack or t(
suppress internal disorder in Kurdistan,
mt the Air Ministry, while not prepared to give an unqualified answer
considered that, with the eight squadrons of aeroplanes that would be in the
country when the Air Force assumed command, it should be possible at leas'
to c may invasion, if not to repel it. With regard to the second question, th(
tr Ministry representative considered that the suppression of disorder, ii
conjunction with levies, was already one of the functions of the Air Force ii
q!~ 1( ls ^ an > as i n Iraq proper, and did not think that the suggested situatioi
r ! ( mered very greatly from the existing one.
Jhat it might b e suggested to Sir P. Cox that Feisal could be told that Hii
Majesty s Government were prepared to do their best with the means at theii
disposal, on the assumption that they would receive adequate support fron
ie local lorces, but that no reinforcements were to be expected Iron
overseas. 1
With regard to the question as to how long His Majesty's Government woulc
_ 61 ie ! ns ® ves responsible, it was decided that this depended on th<
giessma e y tie Aiab Administration; and that the answer might bf
mandfte 88 ^ Majebty S a ° vernmeil b as mandatory, continue to exercise ihc
It was agreed .that the third and fourth questions dealt with matters in wbict
con AT,!- r o 6 ,? lone . were and need not come under the
consideration of the Committee.
Colonial Office,
November 4, 1921.
(Initialled)