File 36/1919 Pt 3 ‘KURDISTAN POLICY & SITUATION’ [‎168ar] (350/608)

NORTHERN KURDISTAN.
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When we occupied Sulaimaniyah, immediately after the armistice, the ramification^ of the-
Kurdish question were as yet unknown and unforeseen, nor indeed did they develop fully until
the following year. Kurdish national aspirations had been put forward in November by General
Sharif Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and in January a Committee of Kurdish Independence formed in Egypt appealed
to us for help in the setting up of a Kurdish State. Sir Mark Sykee suggested the creation
of a Kurdish amirate which should include Mosul, but the idea was rejected by M. Picot on behalf
of the French Government, for, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, Mosul was to be
included in the French sphere of influence.
In northern Kurdistan, soon after the signing of the armistice, the Kurdish movement broke
into fresh activity. It was perhaps fostered by prominent Turks, such as ‘Ali Ihsan Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. who
commanded the Turkish 6th Army at the time of the armistice, and by the Committee of Union
and Progress, with the object of embarrassing the Allies. In January members of the Committee
of Union and Progress were in Kharput, urging the Kurds to claim independence at the Peace
Conference. ‘AJj, Ihsa n visited Kurdish chiefs and supplied them with money, arms and horses
to use against the British if they should attempt to occupy the country. His relations with the
Kurds dated from before the war when he was one of the chief instigators of the massacre of the.
Christians in Bitlis and Van. Towards the end of January he was actively employed at Diyarbakr
in suppressing any expression of anti-Turkish feeling.
In the course of January Sir Mark Sykes, who was then at Aleppo, sent an emissary to the
Kurds of the Tur ‘Abdin, a highland district north of Nisibin, to find out whether they were
likely to resist the British and also to prevent them from providing ‘Ali Ihsan with supplies.
There was found to be a party which desired British protection but where ’Ali Ihsan had
successfully tampered with the tribes they were anti-foreign. At Diyarbakr and at Mardin a
similar anti-foreign agitation had been set on foot, but at Sairt, 75 miles south-west of Lake Van,
the Kurds rose against the Turkish garrison and drove them out, in spite of efforts on the part of
‘Ali Ihsan to bribe the chiefs. At Bashqal‘ah, further south, there was a movement in favour of
Kurdish independence which found sympathy in Persian Kurdistan, the leading figure being Simko,
chief of the Shikak.
At the beginning of Maxell the chief men of Severek, between Diyarbakr and ‘Urfah, visited
the Turkish authorities and the leaders of the local branch of the Committee of Union and
Progress and decided to organize the Turkish forces and the tribes in order to offer resistance
to foreign occupation. They, released Shaikh Mahmud, paramount chief of the Milli Kurds east
of ‘Urfah, who was in prison on a charge of disloyalty to the Government, and ordered him
to call up his tribe and co-operate in driving the British out of ‘Urfah. In return the Turks,
promised to recognize his position with the Milli and to make him the most powerful Kurdish
chief west of the Euphrates. The help he gave after his release amounted, however, to
nothing, for he was unable either to rouse the Kurdish tribes or to keep them together - even
in his own district, nor could the Turks openly support him in flagrant breach of the armistice
and by May the loose confederacy he had tried to create had collapsed. No greater success,
attended the efforts of emissaries despatched from Constantinople by the group led by ‘Abdul
Qadir of Shainsdinan, who was a member of the Turkish cabinet and also President of the
Committee of Kurdish Independence.
In Diyarbakr and Mardin the Kurdish Club was already organized and at work. It was,
composed, according to a subsequent report by Major Noel, mainly of corrupt and /egenerate
notables who, for motives of self-interest, had beqn active supporters of the Committee. With
the defeat of Turkey they were faced with the possibility of the total disappearance of the
Ottoman Empire and joined the Kurdish national party at the instigation of the Turks who held
out to them the bait of Kurdish autonomy under Ottoman auspices. The Club was directed
against British intervention and against the Armenians and stimulated the fears of the Kurds
that the appearance on the scene of any Western Power must inevitably lead to the subjugation
of Moslem to Christian interests. It contained some members who were actuated by a genuine
desire for the welfare of Kurdistan as a whole, but even these more moderate men were
handicapped by having been implicated in the massacres of 1915, by which they had profited
materially.
Although the status of Mosul had not yet been decided, the Wilayat. ravaged by the war, 1
could not be left without administration or assistance, and as soon as the military occupation had
taken place, Colonel Leachman was appointed Political Officer. When preliminary organization
had been completed, officers were despatched east and north to ‘Aqrah and Zakho in order to get
into touch with the Kurds and ensure peace on our borders. Beyond thb armistice frontier the
situation was exceedingly obscure and towards the end of March it was considered essential
to ascertain the trend of feeling in the Turkish zone, not only because without exact knowledge
it would be impossible for the Peace Conference to come to a decision concerning the future of
Kurdistan, but also because the unrest there had already been reflected in Zakho, as was witnessed
by the disturbances which culminated early in April in the murder of Captain Pearson. Agitation
had been started in Jazirat ibn ‘Umar at the beginning of February by ‘Ali Ihsan, whose efforts
here as elsewhere were directed against British occupation. Influential Arabs and Armenians,
were detained without cause as prisoners, traffic on the Tigris, was impeded and the enrolling and
arming of the Kurds were carried on without hindrance, orders from Constantinople that the
terms of the armistice were to be enforced being disregarded by the Kurds, with the connivance
of the local Turkish authorities. A Turkish Officer visited Shamsdinan to spread Turkish