File 36/1919 Pt 3 ‘KURDISTAN POLICY & SITUATION’ [‎233r] (484/608)

Urumia by arrangement with the Persian Government This
suggestion appeared to contemplate a slight extension ' of the
Lersian frontier which was in his opinion, worth considering and
which might fit m with the desire of His Majesty’s Government to
meet the Peisian aspirations for territorial expansion as far as
possible. Whether it would be equally conducive to the future
security of the Assyrian people he could not say.
The only alternative that had been put forward for the
repatriation of the 1 urkish Assyrians was that they should be
settled m an enclave An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. m the neighbourhood of Kochannes and
The War Office appeared also to favour Colonel Wilson’s
suggestions, though the General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia
pointed out that the inclusion of Jezirat-ibn-Omar in the British
sphere ot influence would necessitate the maintenance and support
of a garrison at a considerable distance from Mosul, which would
present certain difficulties^ It was of course impossible to consider
th l e . t 1 ut 4 l [ re Kurdistan without reference to the degree of connection
wtnch the Turks vyould be able to retain with the Kurdish areas.
G j. ia feared that the complete expulsion of the Turks
from Kurdistan was no longer a practicable proposition, but they did
not think that the retention of Turkish authority uncontrolled in
those areas would necessarily be destructive of the scheme proposed
by them, provided that British influence was sufficiently stronuly
maintained in the suggested Kurdish States of Southern Kurdistan
and the Bohtan.
He would ask the Conference to assist him in arriving at a
proposal to put before the Peace Confer ence.
I hei e were two rather disturbing factors which must not be lost
sight of.. T. he first was that Colonel Wilson had apparently abandoned
his original proposal for a fringe of autonomous Kurdish States
round the northern borders of Mesopotamia ; and the second was
that as a result of persistent and unscrupulous propaganda on the
part of the. Turks, the Kurds themselves now appeared to desire to
retain their connection with the Ottoman Empire. If this were
really the case we could no longer regard them, as we had done
hitherto, as a potentially independent State, anxious to free itself
from Turkish dominion and eager to accept our co-operation to attain
this freedom.
There were two main questions on which he would ask the
Conference to assist him in arriving at a conclusion. Firstly, were
we or were we not to accept the recommendation of Colonel Wilson,
supported as it was by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and the War Office, that we
should accept the responsibility for Southern Kurdistan, and, if so,
should it be incorporated in Mesopotamia or treated differently, as
suggested by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ?
Secondly, how were we to fit in our ideas about the future of
Kurdistan with those of the French Government?
Y\ ith regard to the first of these questions, he wished to say
that he personally remained anxious for us to curtail our responsi
bilities as far as we possibly could. He could not help being nervous
about the future, and his anxiety w r as shared by the Cabinet. It
must be remembered that the Cabinet demanded very excellent
reasons in support of any suggestion for the increase of British
military and political commitments. Their attitude might be
described as frankly hostile to any such extension. In reply to the
arguments that Southern Kurdistan was a productive area and had
great potentialities in mineral wealth and tobacco, they not un
naturally replied that these advantages must, be weighed against the
risk to British lives which appeared to be inseparable from our
attempts to obtain control of Kurdish areas.
His own vdew was that it would be preferable to leave Kurdistan
altogether alone. He did not recommend either that it should he
incorporated in the British sphere or that we should establish a kind