‘REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BOMBAY PRESIDENCY, FOR THE YEAR 1919-20’ [‎234r] (15/192)

S oi Bj
iteno '
® year
Ale;
‘BUll
ny-s
^ housiet,
estion
5 Were
1919-1920.]
GENERAL SUMMARY.
is of the K
^ees took s
Karachi,
^ ^ satisfa
e after the
• M -K _
Defence of hid
Ahmett
eedinglj critical
ar y to person oi
me very grare,
'0 be called out
■d 123 wonndei
re destroyed or
3 commendatioi
quired ii
! in
he finally
miversal adie
teavy sentences
excite popular
as the full teit
This feeling
later by tbe
iry Committee,
Moslem circles
turkey
essions
ain resolution:
the Reform:
irest had
ry
the scope ^
]y proved m
tioipated^
through jj
irprise. tf
assent to^
all but*'
Bed whe» “
icalpB*
ndedto 1 *
ireci* 1 j
g eor eM .
.„, s howe*
Ure’Be^f
e.
denied nt the time, it became clear later that the intention was to so obstruct the
working of the Reforms as to make them unworkable and thus force the hands
of Government. A large minority in the Congress were entirely opposed to
this decision and more in agreement with the decision of the moderates to
co-operate in securing the success of the reforms and thereby establish a claim
to the grant of a larger measure of autonomy.
(c) Mahomedan circles were gratified at the special treatment accorded to
Turkey in allowing her to send a delegation to the Peace Conference to repre
sent her views in advance and by the reception by the Allies of a special
Moslem deputation in the matter. As the year wore on, however, and no
definite terms of peace had been formulated, Mahomedan opinion in India,
which was anxiously concerned as to the future status of the Khilafat and the
Sultan’s sovereignty over the Holy Places, became more and more exacerbated.
His Excellency the Viceroy’s reply to the Khilafat deputation which waited on
him in January 1919 was admitted to be both courteous and dignified and to
have exhibited deep sympathy for the Mahomedans in their trouble, but it was
generally considered disappointing in that it contained no indication of the
general lines of the peace terms while tending to increase the anxiety felt in
regard to the future of the Khilafat and the integrity of the Turkish Empire.
The deputation immediately afterwards issued a statement urging the irre
ducible Moslem demand in regard to Turkey to be the status quo ante helium
with guarantees on behalf of the non-Moslem races, and regretting their inabi
lity to give His Excellency the Viceroy an assurance that Indian Moslem loyalty
would be as staunch as ever if the terms of peace were not in consonance with
Moslem demands. The Khilafat deputation took this as the basis of their
mission when they proceeded to England and the Continent shortly afterwards.
Unfortunately it was necessary for the Allied representatives to hold their
deliberations in regard to the terms of peace with Turkey in secret. The
cables were, however, soon busy with forecasts on many of the vital points
affecting Moslem sentiment. Many of these anticipations, often issued with all
tbe assurance of semi-official communications, had subsequently to be contradict
ed but meanwhile they had added to the general feeling of uncertainty and irri
tation. The entry into the arena against Turkey of high ecclesiastical dignitaries
in England with suggestions, among others, in certain quarters that the Mosque
of St. Sophia should be converted into a Christian Church once more was made
the most of by the leaders of the Khilafat agitation as confirming Moslem opinion
that the war against Turkey had been a religions war in disguise—Christian
against Moslem in which Moslem soldiers had been inveigled into fighting against
the Khalifa. The latitude given to all shades of Moslem opinion to ventilate their
views and to consolidate opinion began to be misconstrued and already before the
last quarter of the financial year there was wild talk in Sind and Bombay of
“ JetoZ ”, u ” and “ Non-co-operation ” with Government if the terms
of peace exceeded the limits laid down by the Khilafat party. With a view
to impressing the people of England and allied statesmen with the depth
of Mahomedan feeling a hartal was called for the 19th M&rch and on that
date meetings were also held at which a last appeal was made to England, the
real arbiter, it was urged, in the shaping of the Turkish Treaty.
(d) There were roughly 60 strikes involving almost 200,000 hands during
the year in the Bombay Presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. . The most important of these was the mill
strike in Bombay City involving about 120,000 hands and lasting for a month.
The causes in all these cases were economic, in some respects in a more acute
form than those which precipitated the mill strike of January 1919. There
were almost daily disorders throughout the mill strike in Bombay and in con
sequence a great strain was thrown on the police and the military who were
called out to assist. It was difficult for some time for the men to formulate
their demands, for they had no central organisation to represent them. A
number of societies working in the mill areas were however able to get the men
to elect delegates to represent them and formulate their grievances. Through
the good offices of His Excellency the Governor a settlement was at last
effected.
( 3 ) Under the terms of the Royal Amnesty His Excellency the Governor
ui Council cancelled all executive orders in force under the Defence of India