Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎2r] (3/176)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence.
TO BE RETURNED TO THE SECRETARY
MOST SECRET. OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL LEFELCE
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W. 1, AFT Eft
438-B. MEETING AT WHICH CONSIDERED.
/
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
LIABILITY OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO BLOCKING ATTACK.
Note by the First Lord of the Admiralty.
THE attached paper on the liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack was
originally prepared by the Naval Staff for the information of the Defence of Ports
Sub-Committee of the Joint Oversea and Home Defence Committee.
2. As, however, the paper deals with large questions of policy, in the execution
of which other Government Departments are largely interested, it has been deemed
more appropriate to forward it for the consideration of the Committee of Imperial
Defence.
3. It is, therefore, requested that the paper may be placed before the latter
Committee with a view to its consideration at an early date.
Admiralty, July 24, 1923.
(Initialled) L. S. A.
n , Note by Naval Staff.
Preamble.
1. In the attached paper, the various considerations which determine the
“ Liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack ’ have been analysed on the
assumption that the British Empire is faced with the possibility of a war with
Japan.
2. The liability of the Suez Canal to be blocked depends on—
(a.) The degree to which such an enterprise is likely to benefit the strategy
of and prove attractive to the potential enemy.
(b.) The extent to which the actual difficulties of blocking the Canal can be
overcome by careful preparation.
(c.) The preventive measures which can be organised by the Canal Company
and Powers concerned to deter the potential enemy from carrying out his
object.
3. As regards (a), the conclusion is reached that the benefits which Japanese
strategy would derive from a block of the Suez Canal immediately prior to the
outbreak of war are of such a striking nature that she would spare no pains to
accomplish this object.
The restriction on British sea-pow T er of being denied the use of the Canal during
the earliest stages of a war would be disastrous and would seriously imperil our
chances of ever being able to bring the war to a successful conclusion. One of the
first results) would be the wholesale destruction of seaborne trade in the Indian Ocean
and Australasian waters.
As regards (b), a close examination of the question shows that, in the absence
of adequate deterrents, the difficulties are such as could be overcome by an enter
prising and determined nation.
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B