Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎4r] (7/176)

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I.—Strategical Importance of the Suez Canal to the British Empire, and the Ease
with which this Delicate Link can be Severed in the Event of a War with
Japan becoming Possible.
1. In a memorandum on Naval strategy as affected by the proposed future status
of Egypt, forwarded to the Cabinet by the First Lord on the *29th October, 1920,
the Chief of the Naval Staff remarked as follows :—
“ (1.) In view of the far-reaching proposals with regard to the future Govern-
“ ment of Egypt which are now before the Cabinet, it is desirable that
“the Naval aspect of this question should be clearly stated, as the
“decision which will be taken is one of vital importance to our Naval
“strategy.
“ (2.) The control of the sea communications of the Empire is the duty of the
“Navy, and one of the main arteries of these communications,
“connecting the United Kingdom with India, Australia and our other
“territories in the Far East, passes through the heart of Egypt. r I he
“diversion of traffic to the Cape route in the event of the ('anal not
“being available would be a very grave disadvantage.
“ (3.) The safety of the Suez Canal Route to the East is a matter of more urgent
“ importance at the present time than ever before, for the reason that
“we are called upon to face a Naval situation which has never
“ previously arisen.
“ (4.) Up to the time of the late war, the principal foreign Naval Power was
“concentrated in Europe, and necessitated a similar concentration of
“our Naval forces. At the present time our only two serious rivals on
“ the sea—Japan and the U.S.A.—are to be found in widely separated
“quarters of the Globe, and it is impracticable to keep the Fleet at
“sufficient strength to effect the double concentration at home and in
“ the East which would enable us to meet the situation satisfactorily.
“(5.) The Fleet must, therefore, make up for its lack of preponderance in all
“ oceans by its mobility, that is to say, its capacity for effecting a quick
“ passage to any threatened portion of the Empire.
“(6.) In this question of mobility the Suez Canal plays a vital part. The
“alternative route to the East, via the Cape, is far longer, and time
“may be of the utmost importance; the security or loss of an outpost
“of Empire like Hong Kong may be decided by the availability of the
“ Canal route.
“ (7.) The Suez Canal and its approaches are the most delicate link in the chain
“of Naval communications with the East,since the narrow and shallow
“nature of these waterways renders them more easily open to
“ interruption by attack from land or sea than any other portion of the
“ route.
“ (8.) It is essential to our Naval strategy that the safety of the Canal route is
“ assured to us.”
2. The liability of the Suez Canal to be blocked depends on
(a.) The extent to which the strategy of a belligerent or potential belligerent
would be favourably affected by the blocking of the Canal, and conversely
the unfavourable influence which a block would exert on the strategy of
her potential opponent. In other words, the degree to which such an
enterprise is likely to prove attractive.
(b.) The physical difficulties involved in organising an effective block.
(c.) The precautions taken by the Canal Company and Powers concerned to
prevent the Canal being blocked.
An attempt will be made in the remarks which follow to analyse these various
factors in relation to a hypothetical conflict between Great Britain and Japan, and,
in so far as it lies within the competence of the Admiralty, to indicate what steps
are necessary to reduce to a minimum the liability of the ( anal to be blocked.
3. Should the British Empire ever have to face the probability of war with
Japan, the safety of the Suez Canal from interference will at once become a cause of
grave anxiety.
This anxiety will be greatlv increased if the British Government, acting on its
own initiative, or through the Suez Canal Company, finds itself unable to take such
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