Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎8r] (15/176)

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Defences also perform the important function of denying the enemy the use of
our anchorages and maintenance facilities during periods when our local maritime
supremacy is not secured.
53. The scale of defence of Singapore against seaborne attack and seaborne land
attack must be such as to make it impossible for the enemy to seize and retain the
port, or occupy it temporarily with a view to rendering it useless as a Naval Base,
during the period which will elapse before we can challenge local sea supremacy,
i.e., the period before relief.
54. That Japan would be fully aware of the importance of early arrival of our
Fleet in the East and its bearing on the capacity of Singapore to withstand organised
attack is axiomatic.
That she will do all in her power to impede the passage of our Fleet can also be
taken for granted.
55. As pointed out in C.I.D. Paper 190-C, such action might take the form of—
(a.) Mining of routes.
(b.) Attacks on oilers and oil tanks.
(c.) Attempts at interference with the Suez Canal.
56. In C.I.D. Paper 190-C it was also pointed out that another likely course of
action would consist in attacks on our trade and communications, especially with a
view to holding up the transport of military reinforcements from India to Malaya,
and that the necessary deterrent to such action would be found in the despatch of a
fast mobile force of battle cruisers and attendant light craft ahead of the Fleet, which
would operate in the Bay of Bengal using Trincomali as their base.
57. Of all the courses of action open to Japan on, or in the anticipation of, the
outbreak of war, the blocking of the Suez Canal would appear to be not only the
simplest, but also the one most fruitful of results.
58. By doing so, she could not only hold back our Main Fleet, but could also deny
us the means of safeguarding with our advanced forces our trade, communciations,
oil depots and bases in the Indian Ocean.
59 The Admiralty recommendations regarding ‘‘ scales of attack against winch
“ provision should be made ” in C.I.D. 169-C (which have been noted and approved
by the Committee of Imperial Defence), were based on the assumption that oui Main
Fleet would make the passage to the East via the Suez Canal.
60. In this connection, special attention is invited to the following extract from
C.I.D. 169-C
19. With regard to certain important ports in the Indian Ocean and
“ Arabian Sea, such as Colombo, Bombay and Aden,* and to a lesser degiee ports
“in Australia and the Cape, the chances of attack by Capital Ship vary
“ according to the degree of mobility attained by the Fleet, and by the ability of
“ Singapore to resist all attack. , , ^
“ In recommending provision against a minor scale of attack at these places,
“ i t i s assumed that all measures deemed essential by the Admiralty for the
“ mobility of the Fleet, and by the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry for
“ the defence of Singapore will be carried out, and, in this case, serious attack
“ on the ports situated in the areas mentioned above becomes a danger too remote
“ to justify extensive local measures.
* Trincomali should now be added, see C.I I). 190-C.
61. Assuming that the Canal was blocked ‘ effectively, that is that a heavy
ship was scuttled in one of the rocky portions; assuming also that the scuttling of
the ship was well-timed with reference to the position of our Fleet and the state of
Japanese preparations; the effect on the operations of the British and Japanese
forces would appear to be as follows :
62. The Main British Fleet would be distributed between the Mediterranean and
Home Waters, and, in anticipation of trouble, it is reasonable to suppose that the
Battle Cruiser Squadron would be cruising in the neighbourhood of Malta or the
iEgean, on some pretext connected with Mediterranean affairs, or simply in the course
of its periodical cruise.