Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎12r] (23/176)

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to take emergency action to maintain free navigation of the Suez Canal
for all Nations. ™ • • u n
(ii.) Maintain liaison with the Canal Company through the British Govern
ment Kepresentative on the Board of Directors—Sir Ian Malcolm
and ascertain through him what steps the Canal Company propose
to take in the event of suspicions being aroused that someone intends
to try to block the Canal. . ...
(iii.) When information on this point is available, it might be possible to
advise Sir Ian Malcolm or Lord Inchcape what additional steps we
consider necessary, and ascertain w T hat additional assistance, if an y’
the Canal Company require to create a structure on which a sound
precautionary organisation might be built up.
We have perfectly legitimate reason for doing this by reason ot :—
(a.) The dominating shareholding power of the British Govern
ment.
(b.) The Dominant British shipping interests, amounting to
64 per cent, of total traffic.
(c.) Our position vis-a-vis Egypt- . , , ^
\d.) Suez Canal being a link between the Wings of the Empire.
(iv.) Suggest, through the British Representative, that the number of British
Pilots in the Canal Service should gradually be increased at the expense
of Greeks and Italians. .
The Dutch Director would probably support the proposal that the
number of British and Dutch Pilots should bear some relation to volume
of British and Dutch shipping, Great Britain and Holland being the
greatest users of the Canal.
The process would naturally be a gradual one as vacancies are
infrequent. . T
(v.) Inaugurate intelligence system in Canal Zone as well as in Japan, to
watch loading, &c., of Japanese shipping.
(vi.) Encourage the Canal Company to organise a simple mmesweepmg system
which could be put into force during periods of strained International
relations
(vii) When Eastern International situation becomes clouded, consider the
question of providing and equipping small craft to assist m the
minesweeping of the Canal. „ T
(viii.) Put into force special measures for reporting movements ot Japanese
shipping when war becomes possible.
116 If the British Government and British armed forces were in physical
occupation of the Canal, as was the case during the war, the organisation of
measures designed with the object of preventing the Canal being blocked would not
be difficult.
117. The following are typical of the precautions that would be taken in
collaboration with the Canal Administration .
(i.) Special Examination Service. .
(ii \ Searching of ships not considered altogether trustworthy.
(iii ) Armed Guards and specially selected double Pilots on board ships sail mg
^ nndpr neutral colours or those which for any reason are considered
suspicious. /, i i.
(iv.) Tugs kept in readiness in vicinity of rocky portions of the Canal to move
ships that have been run aground. . J . ... „ .
(v.) Augmentation of salvage plant and staff maintained m vicinity of the
(vi) Rockv portions only to be passed during daylight hours.
(vii.) Sandbag protection to pilots and helmsmen. . . f
(viii ) Special arrangements for clearing the Canal of shipping prior to the
passage of the larger portions of the Fleet. , - *
(ix.) Precautionary minesweeping prior to the passage of portions ot the hleet.