Publications, Newspaper Cuttings, Photographs and Correspondence about Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎330r] (662/879)

Gulf.
Before we can have an intelligible policy, how-
| ever, we must arrive at an intelligent understand-
I ing of what our interests are, and we must
further realise in what direction changes are im
pending and what is their rate of progression.
Commercially, our interests in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. are
incomparably superior, not only to those of any
other European Power, but to the interests of all the
other European States combined; while politically
the command of the gulf is, we believe, essential to
the maintenance of our naval supremacy in the
Indian Ocean, and consequently to the safety of
our Indian Empire. In illustrating the argu-
i ment that the maintenance of the integrity
. of every member of the British Empire is
essential to the welfare of the whole Empire
Captain Mahan, in his recent paper on
Imperial Federation, argued that Canada could
not afford to ignore the presence of a hostile Naval
Power firmly based on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , since this
state of things might seriously affect the ability of
the British Navy and commerce in time of war to
I find their way to the Asiatic coasts of the
whose waters ' 11- waa-
J
-put
wash the wes-
Lord CURZON
iffla MOC 11
uo uoouze, doubt res
HOHEossy
•pua Suyq
JoJ uo.Sug
E Smuzod
vine that we
1:0
Ui
1U
U
O:
2
?
1
pacific Ocean,, the Dominion-Hase his sense
tern seaboard picturesque P anting Russia
terD so expressed in PDssity of prev ?ulf and,
has also - necessity P.sian Su- ‘
• o; easy A of the imper outlet on the TEERoY is n
the395 IFom obtainingtan Surmises, the) ‘ handling
059-11728, as Mr. WHONAN+ the unusual itish Govern-
..... »« ■ sponsible, Nestion by the Be, not make
. the Koweit q swallow does the
went. But as,,00pasfX8aie recog ther kuropean
I summer so csMRSSt slow anz.&YDpment of the
I - --nolitical c-nally safe-
1 We publish to-day the last of the series of valuable id- T
। and interesting articles on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. which or 18
have recently been contributed to the columns of ia sh°
the Morning Post by our Special Correspondent, presence
Mr. H. J. Whigham. From various quarters* a sei248
indications have reached us of the widespread y for u8 ..
interest which Mr. Whigham’s descriptions of is eon
the political and commercial conditions that ved “licit
at present exist on the Persian and Arabian shores lost ex? aed
of the gulf have aroused among our readers, and be ay. co
we cannot doubt that his final survey of the situa- mark as
tion in that part of the world, as it affects the British s land
Empire, will receive the attention it unquestionably ly free
merits. If Mr. Whigham has done no more than: the Gover
direct the attention of our statesmen to the fact that vestigatio".
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. question is not an isolated pro- les bor e e
blem which can be solved by reference to merely arrive a
. v,’ h ar6 to
local conditions, but is an integral element 1 whi, of
s in any general scheme of Imperial policy mplish" asent
which may be framed by a British Cabinet, for the P made
he will have rendered a service to the Empireiggestion. ..
0 which it would not be easy to overrate. It of his Pie .
is true that, at the very outset, the student of the; us to co . mbo
1 foreign policy of Great Britain is assailed by ie mumbo?"
grave doubts whether or not the conduct of ourice of thigora
external relations is informed by any vital e politico is
conception of what are the objects which we the alterne them
should strive to attain, and what are the means t. In - , so
most appropriate to their accomplishment. Inched here even
other words, not even the most optimistic student aproot thelrder-
of British foreign policy can wholly avoid the e province Arabian
suspicion that we have, in fact, no settled toast of the Fully
policy in our relations with neighbouring us to S"e that are
States, no clear idea of what it is that we want, he attacks lacking
and no idea of how we are to get it. The vast- smanship 15
0
.. are to get it. The vast
ness of our Imperial responsibilities affords, no
doubt, an explanation, if not an excuse, for this
failure on the part of Ministers to lay broad and
deep the foundations of an intelligible world
policy ; but the knowledge that the tacl- i-
a diflienlt
noage.
2)<
that the task is
absolve statesmen
it, nor is there
will grow easier
Indeed, the reverse is
a difficult one does not
from the duty of attempting
any prospect that the task
the longer it is postponed. L.ccu, ine
the case, for every succeeding year not only
| increases the bulk of our Imperial burdens, but
adds to the multiplicity of the duties that
1 devolve on individual Ministers and on the
Cabinet as the brain of the Executive Govern
ment. There is one circumstance, however, ex
tremely favourable to the framing of a national
We publish to-day the last of the series of valuable
and interesting articles on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. which
have recently been contributed to the columns of
the Morning Post by our Special Correspondent,
Mr. H. J- WHIGHAM. From various quarters
indications have reached us of the widespread
interest which Mr. WHIGHAM’S descriptions of
the political and commercial conditions that
at present exist on the Persian and Arabian shores
of the gulf have aroused among our readers, and
we cannot doubt that his final survey of the situa
tion in that part of the world, as it affects the British
Empire, will receive the attention it unquestionably
merits. If Mr. Whigham has done no more than
direct the attention of our statesmen to the fact that
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. question is not an isolated pro
blem which can be solved by reference to merely
local conditions, but is an integral element
in any general scheme of Imperial policy
which may be framed by a British Cabinet,
he will have rendered a service to the Empire
which it would not be easy to overrate. It
is true that, at the very outset, the student of the
foreign policy of Great Britain is assailed by
grave doubts whether or not the conduct of our
external relations is informed by any vital
conception of what are the objects which we
should strive to attain, and what are the means
most appropriate to their accomplishment. In
other words, not even the most optimistic student
of British foreign policy can wholly avoid the
suspicion that we have, in fact, no settled
policy in our relations with neighbouring
States, no clear idea of what it is that we want,
and no idea of how we are to get it. The vast
ness of our Imperial responsibilities affords, no
doubt, an explanation, if not an excuse, for this
failure on the part of Ministers to lay broad and
deep the foundations of an intelligible world
policy ; but the knowledge that the task is
a difficult one does not absolve statesmen
from the duty of attempting it, nor is there
any prospect that the task will grow easier
the longer it is postponed. Indeed, the reverse is
the case, for every succeeding year not only
increases the bulk of our Imperial burdens, but
adds to the multiplicity of the duties that
devolve on individual Ministers and on the
Cabinet as the brain of the Executive Govern
ment. There is one circumstance, however, ex
tremely favourable to the framing of a national
policy in foreign affairs which gives us reasonable
grounds for hoping that, though difficult, such a
task is not impossible of accomplishment. The
exigencies of our party system make it impossible
that the direction of the Empire’s foreign relations
shall be entrusted continuously over a lengthened
period to the same man, or even to a succession of
Ministers professing the same opinions on domestic
affairs ; but the disposition among statesmen belong
ing to both the great parties in the State to regard
our foreign relations as outside the sphere of party
controversy has certainly not been weakened by
recent events, and would, we are convinced, be
greatly strengthened if it were possible to believe
that our foreign policy was directed by intelligible
means towards a well-defined object.
Of course, it is quite true that from time to
time the country is favoured with an exposition of
our foreign policy, in which an attempt is made
to refer the particular action which is being
defended at the moment to some intelligible
design. But deeds speak louder than words,
and it is, unfortunately, not difficult to |
cite instances in which, within quite recent years,
the Government of the day has shown itself to
have been blindly groping where it ought to have
been marching forward with firm and assured
step. Perhaps the most striking instance of
our failure to have thought out an intelligible
policy is furnished in recent times by the case of
Africa, though there are episodes in the diplomatic
history of the Far Eastern question which would
equally well serve the purpose of illustration. Can
it be imagined for a moment that if the Foreign
Office, in the early stages of the modern partition of
the African Continent,had realised the importance of
the appearance on the scene of Germany and France
as participants in the scramble, and had arrived
at an intelligible idea of what was the object to
which our policy ought to be directed in Africa,
that our West Coast Colonies would now be mere
enclaves An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. , cut off from all communication one
with another, and debarred from access to the
interior by a continuous band of French territory ?
But, indeed, no more striking instance could be
asked than is furnished by the recent history
of our relations with Persia. It is but little more
than two years since Persia obtained a loan of |
22,500,006r ou files from Russia and pledged the whole !
of her customs revenues, “exclusive of those of Fars
and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. po cs," as security. Before
availing himself of the good offices of the
Russian Government the Shah had sought to
obtain a loan from Great Britain, but to the dis
may . id despair of our local representatives the
Impei : 1 authoriti e of sed to make the advance
on terms which were acceptable to the Persian
Governme it. It was a great opportunity missed,
and to-day it is recognised that we committed
that something which has been said to be,
' X " -
4 if'
worse than a crime—a blunder. If it be asked
| who is responsible it is easy to lay the blame
on the CHANCELLOR of the Exchequer, but we
। have only to look a little deeper in order to see
i that the blunder was made because it was not
I sufficiently recognised that our interests in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and in Southern Persia imperatively
required that we should make full use of such an
opportunity for extending our influence over Persian
affairs. Had the Foreign Office been able to convince
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach that the loan of a
comparatively trifling sum would subserve the
legitimate development of a recognised Imperial
policy the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not
have successfully opposed the loan, for the Cabinet
would have overridden his opposition had it been
pushed to extremities. But the Foreign Office failed
to carry its proposal because it did not itself realise
the importance of the transaction, or in other words
because it had not thought out an intelligible
policy, and could not, therefore, appreciate at its
true value the bearing of this individual trans
action on our interests in Persia and the Persian
Gulf.
Before we can have an intelligible policy, how
ever, we must arrive at an intelligent understand
ing of what our interests are, and we must
further realise in what direction changes are im
pending and what is their rate of progression.
Commercially, our interests in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. are
incomparably superior, not only to those of any
other European Power, but to the interests of all the
other European States combined; while politically
the command of the gulf is, we believe, essential to
the maintenance of our naval supremacy in the
Indian Ocean, and consequently to the safety of
our Indian Empire. In illustrating the argu
ment that the maintenance of the integrity
of every member of the British Empire is
essential to the welfare of the whole Empire
Captain MAHAN, in his recent paper on
Imperial Federation, argued that Canada could
not afford to ignore the presence of a hostile Naval
Power firmly based on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , since this
state of things might seriously affect the ability of
the British Navy and commerce in time of war to
find their way to the Asiatic coasts of the
Pacific Ocean, whose waters wash the wes
tern seaboard of the Dominion. Lord Curzon
has also expressed in picturesque phrase his sense
of the imperative necessity of preventing Russia
from obtaining an outlet on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and,
as Mr. Whigham surmises, the Viceroy is no
doubt responsible for the unusually firm handling
of the Koweit question by the British Govern
ment. But as one swallow does not make
a summer so the spasmodic recognition of the
doctrine that we cannot allow any other European
Power to regulate the political development of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. will not enable us to effectually safe
guard our interests in that part of the world. The
first question to be decided is whether it is or is not
a matter of indifference to us that Russia should
obtain a port on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . If the presence
of Russia on the gulf does not constitute a serious
danger to our Imperial interests it is folly for us to
play the dog in the manger ; but it is equally
foolish and dangerous if we have arrived at an
opposite conclusion not to say so in the most explicit
language known to diplomacy. What is to be avoided
is the fatal indecision which has marked so
much of our recent diplomacy, and has landed us
more than once in positions not wholly free from
embarrassment. But if we assume that the Govern
ment has not shrunk from a frank investigation of
the political situation in the countries bordering
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , the next step is to arrive at some
definite conclusion as to the means which are to
be employed for the successful accomplishment of
our purpose. We do not propose for the present
to discuss in detail the various suggestions made
by Mr. Whigham, but the essence of his pleading
is that it is no longer possible for us to continue
offering sacrifices at the shrine of the mumbo-jumbo
of the status quo. The maintenance of things as
they are is no more possible in the political world
than in the realm of nature ; the alternative is
between an advance or a retreat. In Northern
Persia Russia has already established her stakes so
firmly that we cannot hope to uproot them, even
were we so desirous ; but in the provinces border
ing the gulf and on the eastern coast of the Arabian
Peninsula it is still open to us to successfully
defend our position against the attacks that are
threatening, unless our statesmanship is lacking
both in prescience and in courage.