The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎594r] (78/239)

HOW IT STRUCK A CONTEMPORARY. 47
defended by the armed forces of this country. Lord Palmerston
said in the House of Commons that ‘ ‘ if any violent attempt were
made to overthrow their rights and interfere with their independ
ence, those who made the attempt would find in the result that
it would not be with Denmark alone with wdiich they would
have to contend.” Only one interpretation could fairly be placed
on those words, but, nevertheless, when Austria and Prussia made
their joint attack in 1864, it was with Denmark alone that the
issue was fought out, and except in one unimportant sea-fight,
the Danes were utterly w r orsted. England was now out of the
affair, and in a peace concluded at Berlin, the Danes surrendered
the Duchies into the hands of the allies. The cession of Holstein
to Austria j^rovided—and was no doubt intended to provide—the
ground for the quarrel between Prussia and Austria, which was
the next of Bismarck’s remorseless designs.
The second volume of Lord Salisbury’s Essays is mainly
occupied with this question. It is the chief theme of two of the
essays, the third deals with the cognate question of Poland, which
had exercised Europe during the previous year, and in which
also Great Britain had played the part of ineffective remonstrant.
Lord Salisbury’s argument takes the form of a controversial
dilemma, and is driven home with unsparing logic. Either Lord
Palmerston and Lord Bussell should not have used the language
of menace to Prussia and Austria, or they should have made good
their w^ords when Prussia and Austria defied them. Either they
should not have led Denmark to expect assistance, or they should
have stood by her when she was attacked. Whether Lord Salis
bury himself was in favour of armed intervention, has been
debated since these Essays appeared, but the natural inference
from the closing passage of the Essay entitled The Danish
Duchies is certainly that he was. 1 That, however, is immaterial
for present purposes. His argument, as it stands, is unanswer
able. There is no defence for the diplomacy which threatens
without counting the cost, and though his invective is fiercer than
the manner of these times, and could hardly have been agreeable
reading to those of his contemporaries who cherished illusions
about their country, yet its effect is salutary, and it clears the
ground for a new departure in British policy. From henceforth
Great Britain was not to interfere in the politics of Western
Europe, but to devote her whole energy to sea-power, and to
expansion over-sea.
For the purposes of current controversy, nothing could have
been more effective than Lord Salisbury’s line of argument. Yet,
in looking back on it, we are struck with the limitations in the
(1) Essays, II., 148.