The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎639v] (169/239)

138 PEACE AND INTERNAL POLITICS : A LETTER FROM RUSSIA.
must solve the question. The Autocracy was not even fit to make
peace. Such was the popular attitude. As regards the chances
of success, diplomatic circles expressed frank incredulity. Ad
mitting, what everyone knew, that President Roosevelt had issued
his public Note after private consultations which left no loophole
for misunderstanding, it was predicted that his intervention
would end in a disastrous fiasco, the effect of which, by frighten
ing other would-be intermediaries off the ground, would be to
prolong the struggle beyond its normal length. “ The Tsar will
aot, of course, reject the offer,” said the sceptics; “he has
already in private accepted it. But he accepted it as convener of
the Hague Conference, and to put himself right before the world.
As Autocrat of All the Russias he has no intention of making a
surrender which will make his' Autocracy a laughing-stock.”
Old-time diplomatists here gibed mildly at Mr. Roosevelt’s vague
humanitarianism ; and most of them are now quite willing to
make even bets that Vladivostock will be under siege next Christ
mas Day.
Taking into account the instability of Russian Liberalism, and
the incredulity of diplomats, such attitudes were perfectly
normal and characteristic. But it is now becoming quite plain
that the obstacles to the conclusion of peace are not so much
the extravagance of Japan’s expectations, even from Russia’s
point of view, or the new diplomacy of Mr. Roosevelt, but the
hopelessly unpractical attitude of the St. Petersburg Foreign
Office. It has, of course, long been a matter of common know
ledge here that Nicholas II. desired to continue the war. It was
easy for his Ministers to advise ending a vain struggle. But the
pain and shame of surrender would fall upon him, and be his
torically associated with his reign. The Opposition threatening
his Autocracy would find the new cry, ” humiliating peace,”
more potent than the old one, ‘‘incapably-conducted war.”
But when Nicholas II., abjuring his old oaths and resolutions,
sanctioned the preliminary negotiations which led to Mr. Roose
velt’s Note, the whole situation changed. The St. Petersburg
Foreign Office at once adopted a lofty and indifferent tone, hinted
that :
There’s but the twinkling of a star
Between a man of peace and war;
and that Russia really cared nothing for the issue, which w’as, if
not a joke, a side issue and interlude in a campaign which was still
to be continued till the Tsar’s armies were victorious. The
Foreign Office solemnly kept up the pretence that Nicholas II.
indulgently considered Mr. Roosevelt’s Note solely to please