The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎586r] (62/239)

THE BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN.
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under exceptional limitations in that he was not permitted to
risk any of his big ships. He relied in the initial attacks upon
the Russian Fleet almost entirely upon torpedo craft sup
ported by cruisers. His first operations were so completely
successful that from the date of his first attack by torpedoes the
Russian Fleet was demoralised, and so seriously crippled that it
was practically useless. Far from the torpedo having proved
inefficient, three of the main ships of the Russian squadron w T ere
seriously damaged even while anchored under the shore guns
at Port Arthur, and would probably have been completely de
stroyed but for the protection afforded by the land defences and
the close proximity of the harbour of Port Arthur, into which
they were able to limp for repairs. So long as the Port Arthur
squadron was a fleet in being, it was the torpedo, adequately
supported by the gun, which rendered it ineffective. That the
Russian ships injured by torpedo attack were patched up, thanks
to the resourcefulness of a Scotsman, and were able subsequently
to put to sea was merely due to the good fortune which enabled
them to creep into the neighbouring port. The Russian squadron
in Port Arthur, however, never recovered in moral the effects
of the torpedo attacks. The battle of the Sea of Japan supplies
even more conclusive evidence as to the falseness of the conclusion
that the torpedo is ineffective. The battle was opened by long-
range firing by the Japanese which seems to have completely
unnerved the Russian sailors. Then as darkness fell the torpedo
craft, again supported by the gun-ships, well in the rear, swarmed
round the disordered fleet, and practically completed its destruc
tion. How many ships were actually sunk by the action of the
torpedo we do not know, but the inference to be drawn from
Admiral Togo’s despatches and other information is that this
weapon was responsible for the sinkng of several of the battleships
and cruisers. One morai to De drawn from the battle is that the
policy of the Admiralty in regarding the gun and torpedo as
complementary weapons, each having its place in the battle
tactics of a fleet, is well founded. If the Japanese had accepted
Admiral Bridge’s conclusion that the torpedo is a weapon of
limited usefulness and only to be infrequently employed, they
would not have provided themselves with one hundred torpedo
craft, and the battle of the Sea of Japan would have had quite
another ending.
(4) The Importance of Gunnery.
A feature of the fight which stands out in the most striking
manner is the accuracy wdth which the Japanese gunners must
have shot. A man-of-war is not a yacht, and the Japanese, w T hile