The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎584v] (59/239)

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THE BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN.
to their superior speed, headed off our columns, their battleships
concentrating their fire on our leading battleship. Again, de
scribing the manner in which the Japanese encircled them, the
Russian admiral says : “ Owing to the low speed of our ships it
was difficult to escape from this position.”
Of the great armada wdiich Russia had fitted out with
so much boasting and parade there remained by Monday
morning only four cruisers and two destroyers w T hich escaped,
apart from the two battleships and the two coast defence ships
which were forthwith taken to Japanese ports as prizes. It is
calculated that in the battle about 14,000 Russians were drowned,
and Admiral Togo claims to have secured over 3,000 prisoners.
Admiral Togo’s tactics were marvellously successful. In achiev
ing his great task of wiping the Russian Fleet off Far Eastern
seas he lost only three torpedo boats, while the casualties in the
whole of his fleet were merely 113 officers and men killed, and 424
officers and men wounded.
Apart from the important lesson which the destruction of the
Russian Fleet supplies—that paper estimates of materiel strength
are no true guide to fighting power—can any other deductions be
drawm from this complete annihilation of Admiral Rojdestvensky’s
force? Without embarking on matters of detail, even at this
early date it is possible to draw r profitable conclusions on broad
lines from the battle.
(1) The ” Llamas ” in Battle.
What did it profit Admiral Rojdestvensky that he had at his
command a large number of obsolescent and obsolete men-of-war?
In face of the bold elimination from the British war fleet of
vessels of small or minus fighting value, a great deal has been
heard of the probability that in time of war officers would take to
sea “ anything on which they could fly the ensign.” This sounds
heroic, but is really imbecility. Every ship in the fleet which is
not of real fighting value is an embarrassment to an admiral and
not an acquisition of strength. Coal strategy in these days
governs the movements of men-of-war, and as a rule it is true
that the older the ship the more coal she consumes, and conse
quently the supply of fuel available for veritable men-of-war is
depleted. Admiral Rojdestvensky had under his command a won
derful assortment of ships similar in characteristics to those which
in the British Navy have been relegated to the “llama” list
or the “ obsolete ” list. He appreciated so little the truth which
underlies the policy of the British Admiralty that he waited in
order that Admiral Niebogatoff might join him off the Cochin