The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎650r] (190/239)

FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN.
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that branch of the subject. The moral deduction is more signifi
cant. It is that “the Will cannot, may not, dare not dictate
whereto the inquiries of the Understanding shall lead; and that
to allege that it ought is to plant the root of Insincerity, False
hood, Bigotry, Cruelty, and Universal Rottenness of Soul.”
Let us consider in the first place what this pronouncement
means, and, in the second place, what is its bearing upon con
temporary theological conditions. It means that religion and
dogma are two different things which have nothing whatever to do
with each other, and that every religion is irreligious in propor
tion as it is dogmatic, seeing that, in so far as it is dogmatic,
it enslaves the understanding and the moral sense, and imposes
either a certain juggling with words, or a false pretence of assent
to propositions which in some cases mean nothing at all, in other
cases are demonstrably untrue, and in a third class of cases may
be the subject of legitimate differences of opinion. Its bearing
upon present theological conditions lies in the fact that, while
our formularies are what they were three hundred years ago, the
dogmas which those formularies are supposed to contain and to
express are very obviously in a state of flux. The posing of the
question of the proper relations between religion and dogma had
its importance even at a period when the dogmas were definite
and were generally accepted. It has a greater, because a more
practical importance now that no one knows exactly what the
dogmas are or can predict the view that will be taken of any one
of them by any particular divine.
Self-examination is a religious duty taught from the pulpit;
but the weakness of the pulpit lies in the tendency to use lan
guage as if for the purpose of confusing instead of clarifying
thought. If that tendency could be resisted, and if we could get
plain answers to certain plain questions, the ground might quickly
be cleared, and possibilities of reconstruction properly considered.
There is always the difficulty, of course, that no Church has
authority to speak for Christianity as a whole, and that no
individual, except the Bishop of Borne, has authority to speak
for any Church. But there are some theologians who, in some
vague way, because of their position or their attainments, may
be accounted representative men. They have followers who
defer to them, who echo their phrases, and esteem them leaders
of thought. One would include among such men the Archbishop
of Canterbury, the Bishops of London and Birmingham, the
Deans of Ripon and Westminster, Canons Cheyne, Driver, and
Hensley Henson, and the chairmen of the various Free Church
Unions. To such men one may appeal to reduce theological
thought to its lowest terms, and to be as candid with theological