The Fortnightly Review: No. CCCCLXIII, New Series [‎606r] (102/239)

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.
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subject in the exercise of his religion, did more to stop the cow
killing agitation, and mitigate the jealousies of rival creeds, than
any repressive measure taken. The Senaputty would not have
paid the extreme penalty for his abominable treachery had a less
firm ruler been in office. In prosecuting the Bungobasi, the most
influential vernacular journal, he taught the Yellow Press of India
that there are limits to British endurance.
Lord Lansdowme’s firmness in compelling the friendship of
Abdurrahman, whose loyalty in the ’eighties was unquestionably
wavering, proved displeasing to the Wedderburnian wing of the
Radical Party. Shortly before his term came to an end Providence
and a forgiving country had placed Gladstone again in power.
To appease the Little Englanders—who were born then, but had
not yet been christened—Mr. Gladstone proposed to reverse Lord
Lansdowne’s policy. The late Sir Henry Norman was designated
Viceroy, not because he was the best man, not because he was
nominated by Court influence like Lord Moira, the friend of the
Prince Regent, but simply because he was known to be opposed
to the policy of Lord Lansdowne. Norman’s nomination was
condemned both in India and at home. But St. Petersburg re
joiced. The Novbe Vremya was made glad. Happily wiser
councils prevailed. Sir Henry withdrew, and Lord Elgin and
Kincardine was appointed, and preserved the continuity of Lord
Lansdowne’s policy. After three years of inaction during which,
on the authority of Lord Rosebery, his government had been but
“ ploughing the sands,” the Liberals were dismissed from office.
For the third time Lord Salisbury assumed power, and Lord
Lansdowne became Secretary for War. That he had assimilated
the working of our military system, and appreciated its defects,
is clear from his speech on Army Reform in the House of Lords
on 25th August, 1895. 1 There he expressed approval of an Army
Board; he complained that the Commander-in-Chief was in
vested with too much pow T er; he urged the constitutional position
of direct responsibility to the Secretary of State for War. He also
urged that the consultative element was insufficiently represented
in Pall Mall, and that under the existing system the Defence of the
Empire as a whole was sorely neglected. Those views expressed
ten years ago underlie the present reforms at the War Office. To
carry them into effect he laboured unostentatiously, without any
attempt at what is called “window-dressing,” but found himself
beset on all sides by men who had been trained in the worst
tradition, and whose interests were bound up in the status quo.
Some progress, however, had been made at the outbreak of war,
when hope of further advance was for the moment necessarily
(1) Hansard, 4th series, Vol. XXXVI., p. 770 et seq.