تقارير إدارية من الخليج العربي ١٨٨٣/١٨٨٤ – ١٩٠٤/١٩٠٥ [و‎‎١‎٠] (٦٠٢/٢٤)

f ;;3SIDE^XI AND MUSCAT POLITICAL AGENCY FOR 1883-84.
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PART 11.
ADMINISTRATION EH FORT (:■? THE MUSCAT POLITICAL AGENCY FOR THE YEAR 1883-84.
PoUiicak— N< o; -iug h&d. oeeaiTed during the early part of the year 1883 to disturb the
general tranquility o ! Oinan, 1 the official year 1883-84 opened favourably.
In M ay the i:-hiq attempted, to renew negoeiations with Shaikh Hilal-bin-Zahir of the
Beni Hma through vn r,mediation of Hamood-el-Jahafee for the surrender of the fort at Nezwa,
which Hilal nad pr<.? v i i bef ore to deliver up for a certain sum, but nothing came out of it,
and the fort still re . jssession of Hilal. The quarrel that had arisen in the previous
year between the ? . r v- yeen and Rehbiyeen on the one side, and the Beni Jabir on the other,
aborai tVt© village of Seroor, now broke out afresh, and, in view of the behaviour of the former
tribes, the Sultan began to consider whether the subsidy they received for holding the passes
should not be trar ferred to the Beni Jabir.
Shaikh ; . cd-el-Jahafee sided with the Nidabiyeen in this affair, and His Highness
endeavours to entice him into Muscat, where he intended to seize him. But Hamood was
stopped ' Senaii, and the plot failed. Offers of money were then made to induce Hamood
to rf: e, but ijvjr were refused: shortly after, however, Hamood, after unsuccessfully raiding
1? 1 Beni Jabir, returned to Sharkiyeh. In the meantime the Beni Jabir, aided by a contin-
o t from Nakhl, occupied the Nidabiyeen houses in Seroor and cut down their date trees, and
ho latter were compelled to sue for a truce.
At the end of June the Sultan received letters from His Highness Seyyid Abdul Azeez and
Shaikh Saleh-bin-Ali, openly declaring their intention of assisting the Nidabiyeen against the
Be Jabir, whereupon, to avoid further complications and to put an end to the quarrel. His
Hi nness despatched messengers to Semail to summon the Shaikhs of the Nidabiyeen, Rehbi-
s en, Siabiyeen, and Beni Jabir to Muscat with a view to the final and amicable settlement of
^he whole question.
On the 6th July, however, the Envoys returned to Muscat unsuccessful and reported that
the Nidabiyeen and Rehbiyeen Shaikhs had gone to Sharkiyeh. His Highness Seyyid Toorkee
now despatched Shaikh Shamis to his brother Abdul Azeez, desiring him to prevent any rising
in the Sharkiyeh, to which Seyyid Abdul Azeez replied that the Rehbiyeen Shaikh had gone
with the Haboos to Saleh-bin-Ali to concert an attack on the Beni Jabir, but, as regards himself,
he would not interfere if his brother Toorkee desired it. It is now well known that this quarrel
about Seroor had been carefully fomented and increased, almost from the first, by the intrigues
of Shaikh Saleh, whose subtle mind had perceived that if he could separate the two tribes holding
the passes between Sharkiyeh and Muscat from allegiance to the Sultan he would have gained
an important advantage in the event of his being able to organize another rising against His
Highness. Not only did he succeed in this, but' he managed to make the quarrel itself the
pretext for his rebellious proceedings subsequently.
The Beni Jabir now expecting an attack by the Sharkiyeh tribes applied to the Sultan for
reinforcements, and His Highness prepared to move out to Semail in person. But from this
he was dissuaded, and shortly after the Nidabiyeen wrote in to say that they would no longer
receive His Highnesses subsidy or hold the passes for him.
In July a collision occurred at Barka between the Wahabee garrison and the town^s people,
resulting in two men being killed and six wounded. The town^s people having been worsted
called in the aid of the Ma^Awalees, who came down and besieged the fort. The Wazeer
Seyyid-Saeed, however, was despatched to Barka in the I)ar-el-Salem, and effected a satis
factory adjustment of the affair.
Early in August it was reported in Muscat that a rising would certainly take place (after
the Ramzan E'ed) of the Hinawi tribes in Sharkiyeh to support the Nidabiyeen against the
Beni Jabir, and it was expected that the insurgents would not confine themselves to the Semail
valley, but continue their march to Muscat.
On the 14th August news arrived that Seyyid Abdul Azeez and Shaikh Saleh, with a large
force, had reached the Akk Pass, and two days later His Highness received letters from his
brother and Saleh-bin Ali, announcing their intention of coming on to Muscat. Preparations
were accordingly made for defence, and the friendly tribes were being called in when news
arrived, on the 20th, of t he break-up of the coalition and return o ( ' ohe insurgents to Sharkiyeh.
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