"الملف 73/7 II (D 22) وضع الكويت - سكة حديد بغداد، والمفاوضات الأنجلو تركية" [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٢] (٥٤٠/٣٩٠)

But it is at least open to argument that the Turks will not carry their objection
to the 50 per cent, arrangement to the point of letting the negotiations break
down :—
(1) As has been urged above, it is important to them that the railway should
be made;
(2) They know that, whatever may be the value to us of Turkish friendship,
the value to themselves of our friendship is much greater, and, if
brought gently but firmly up to the point, it is likely that they will
think twice before sacrificing it.
VII. The Procedure to he adopted now. —If the above views, which are only a
development of those expressed in India Office letters of the 3rd and the 29th March,
1911, are accepted, the doubt arises whether it is worth while to press for the 50
per cent, at all; whether it is not better to abandon the railway altogether and
devote ourselves entirely to the river and the Gulf on the lines suggested above.
But if it be decided that an attempt should be made to secure 50 per cent., the
next question is how. This is really a question for the Foreign Office. The India
Office have suggested that we should go direct to the German Government, and the
Board of Trade, in their letter of the 7th April 1911, recommended that a confiden
tial conference should be held with the authorities of the Baghdad Railway as a
preliminary to further negotiations with Turkey.
If it is held to be impossible to go to Germany independently of Turkey, the
only course is apparently to inform the Turks that their own proposals being quite
inacceptable, we find ourselves unable to negotiate on the basis of the German
declaration of the 7th March 1911, but that if they choose to approach Germany
with a view to modifying this, declaration so as to give us 50 per cent., and the cast
ing vote, we will use our good offices with Germany and be willing to discuss with
her the terms of a settlement on those lines, on the understanding that Turkey
concludes an entirely satisfactory arrangement with us in the river and Gulf.
VIII. The Alternative. —It is necessary to consider the possibility that if we
take either of the lines suggested, the Turks will break off the negotiations alto
gether, as regards both the railway and the Gulf. It is not thought likely, for the
reasons, suggested under head VI, that this will happen, though they may hint at
it by way of bluff. But if they did, it would seem that we should be morally in a
very strong position if we could come before the public and say : " We have made
every effort to meet the Turks over the question of this railway, but without suc
cess. But we do not wish to block it if we can get a settlement of vexatious ques
tions in the Gulf. We have accordingly offered them a free hand for the railway
as far as Basrah (beyond which, if it is ever made, it will never pay) and the increas
ed customs duties in return for a recognition de jure of the position in the Gulf,
which we have held de facto for a century, and they have refused.."
Our policy would then be the maintenance, by force if necessary, of that posi
tion. We should have to reckon with Turkish hostility both to ourselves and to
the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Mohammerah. The kind of measures which we should
take are indicated in the Government of India's letter No. 24 of the 15th Feb
ruary, 1912*, and, if driven to it, we should declare a protectorate over Kuwait.
The strength or weakness of our position would then depend largely on the state of
our relations with Germany. But it would seem that Germany would have no
ground for taking exception to our action if we could tell her that we had been
(and still were) anxious to make an arrangement with her, but had found the
Turks so irreconcilable that they would not even accept the free hand for the
railway which we had offered them.
This contingency is mentioned merely for the sake of completeness. It is
almost incredible that it should occur at a time when more than for many years
past Turkish interests calmour for the good-will of Great Britain.
Rear-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade has read and agrees with all the above
remarks.
India Office, June 6, 1912. ^ jj
i A* w 0f Tur ! dsh ^ vessels ' buo y s ' &c - ' ejection of Turks from Bubiyan and El Katr (in
cluding El Bidas); occupation of Pao. *
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