مجموعة ١/١٧ "العلاقات بين العراق ونجد: اتفاقية حسن الجوار وتسليم المجرمين؛ معاهدة الصداقة، ١٩٣٦" [و‎‎٧‎١] (٨٥٧/١٤١)

J
^ THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
fF. Z. j
1 JC99 ;
April 11. 1938.
K
CONFIDENTIAL.
\ i938_J
Section 2.
[E 2059/1573/25] Copy No.
Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received April 11.)
(No. 55.)
My Lord, Jedda, March 22. 1938.
SEVERAL communications which I have had the honour to send you recently
will have suggested that the Iraq Government are pursuing a very active policy
in Saudi Arabia. this activity has coincided with the arrival of the new
Iraqi Charge d’Affaires, Saiyid Thabit Abdul Nur (Iraq Personalities No. 83 of
18th January, 1937), a very busy-minded man of Christian origin. When I first
received information from the Saudi authorities of the various proposals made
to them by Saiyid Thabit I was inclined to suppose that he was acting to some
extent on his own account, but in each case I have been shown documents proving
that the proposals were official. The proposals are three in number :—
(1) For the conclusion of a military agreement to implement article 7 of the
i Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance (mv telegram No. 76, dated
the 19th March).
(2) For unification of the currencies of Iraq and Saudi Arabia (my telegram
No. 75, dated the 19th March, and mv despatch No. 51, dated the
21st March).
(3) For the conclusion of a triangular quota arrangement by which Saudi
Arabia, in return for a commission, would refuse to take Japanese
exports unless Japan agreed to take Iraq exports up to the same
value (my telegram No. 75, dated the 19th March, and my despatch
No. 44. dated the 11th March).
2- 1 here are indications that the Iraq Government have not informed His
Majesty’s Government of their intention to put these proposals forward.
Whether this secrecy is compatible with the provisions of article 1 of the
Anglo-Iraq Ireaty of 1930 is not for me to say. My concern is with the
interesting fact that Ibn Saud turns to a non-Moslem and “imperialistic”
Government for disinterested advice about proposals from a Moslem Government
which is, moreover, bound to him by a treaty of Arab brotherhood and alliance.
He is clearly afraid lest he should be lured into some arrangement injurious to
his interests, and he has now extended to the economic field the suspicions which
he has always held about the political activities of the Iraq Government. Of those
suspicions the Foreign Office have been kept informed. They rose to their
highest point during the Hikmet Sulaiman regime, but they have not subsided
completely since it came to an end. Ibn Saud does not regard Iraq as a purely
Arab country. He is fond of saying that the Iraq Arabs are from Nejd, but he
regards the country as largely non-Arab in policy as well as in population
and as liable if not to be pro-Turk at least to act under Turkish influence or
menace.
3. One thing which Ibn Saud resents in his relations with Iraq is the
tendency which he detects in them to try to take the lead in the Arab world
at his expense. He has spoken of this more than once, in connexion with the
Palestine question and with the negotiations with the Imam about the Treaty
of Brotherhood and Alliance. That the Iraq Government may sometimes be
heedless of Saudi feelings is illustrated by a remark which Saiyid Thabit made
to me recently, in connexion with the arrangements for a joint Saudi-Iraq survey
of their common frontier. It appears that the Iraqi' representatives arrived
at the spot where the survey was to begin, but the Saudis were not there, and
the Saudi Government said that their party could not arrive for another
fortnight or more. “ I do not understand ” said Saiyid Thabit, “ why the Iraq
party could not act for both sides, but though I talked to Fuad for an hour
[280 1—2]