ملف ٣٦٦٥\١٩٢٤ الجزء ١ "الجزيرة العربية:- الوضع ١٩٢٤. الهجوم الوهابي على الحجاز. الاستيلاء على الطائف وهزيمة جيش الحجاز. تنازل الملك حسين عن العرش." [و‎‎٥] (٨٥٢/١٨)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government. 1
1 P
EASTERN (Arabia).
1 4893
j December 3, 1924.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
A
1
AS
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Section 3.
[E 10783/7624/91]
No. 1.
Consul Bullard to Mr.
Austen Chamberlain.-
-{Received, December 3.)
(No. 108. Secret.)
Sir, Jeddah, November 8, 1924.
I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the
31st October to the 8th. November.
2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to India, Egypt,
Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden,
Singapore, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Report for the Period, October 31-November 8, 1924.
(Secret.)
THE Wahabis have made no direct movement against Jeddah, but whether this
is because they feel that the town is too strong for them to attack or because they are
awaiting Ibn Saud’s arrival is not known. They have, however, raided and burned
properties belonging to the Shereef Muhsin, towards the upper end of Wadi Fatmah,
the fertile valley which cuts the Mecca—Jeddah road at an acute angle. Muhsin,
who has much influence with the Bedouin, seems to have coquetted with the Wahabis
for some time, but finally to have decided to support Ali, and the destruction of his
properties is no doubt an act of revenge. Two places on the Mecca—Rabigh road,
As fan and Dafl (near Khalis), inhabited by sections of the Harb tribe, have also been
raided, the Harb defeated, qnd cattle and other supplies secured. Asfan is believed
to be under Wahabi occupation. These raids on the Harb are probably to punish
them for promising to support Ali, though a desire to establish communication with
Rabigh, which has declared for the Wahabis, may be an additional motive. The
Harb gave no support to Hussein, but for the last ten days they have been coming
to Jeddah to collect money and food-stufls in exchange for promises of help. As the
Harb number, perhaps, 20,000, and stretch from Medina to Mecca, they ought to be
able to play a decisive part in the struggle, but the various sections are not united,
and the Harb valour has rarely been tried except against unarmed pilgrims. Ah
believes that the Harb expect to get more out of his regime than they could ever get
under Ibn Saud, who would probably neither pay them a subsidy nor permit them
to rob pilgrims, and that their help can therefore be counted upon, but the severe
defeat which they have suffered at the hands of the Wahabis may outweigh vague
hopes of financial advantage.
2. The defences of Jeddah are continually being strengthened. The town is
now surrounded with wire as well as with trenches. More volunteers have arrived
from Akaba, making about 800 in all. Most of them are apparently irom Trans-
jordania and Palestine. There are also in Jeddah several hundred Juhainah
tribesmen of doubtful value from Yambo. Considerable quantities of small-arm
ammunition have been received from Akaba; this is probably from Medina, where
the Turks held enormous supplies when the war came to an end. The aeroplanes and
armoured cars promised by Ali for the 5th November have not appeared, but
authentic information has been received that a P. and O. steamer which has just
left England is bringing aeroplanes to Jeddah. As there is only one pilot of doubtful
value left—a Moslem—they can hardly be of much use. A foreigner here who is m
touch with the Russian refugees in Egypt was, asked by the local authorities to give
them the names of some Russian aeroplane pilots, but, after consulting the Soviet
agent, he refused. The Soviet agent objects to the engagement of Russian pilots by
the Liedj az Government, partly because the Soviet Government is neutral, but mainly,
it appears, because it tends to damage the Soviet Government’s prestige that Russian
pilots can be found when no other Europeans will accept employment heie.
[808 c—3]