مجموعة ٢٨/١١٢أ "بلاد فارس. تبريز - رسائل شهرية عن الوضع الداخلي في أذربيجان وتقارير متنوعة." [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٧] (١٢٣٧/٢٥٥)

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authorities, the most active force in the affairs of Azerbaijan. It underwent a
test at the crisis of the oil concession agitation and emerged from it stronger than
before. The series of demonstrations organised to protest against Sa’id s
policy showed the leaders how many men they could put on the street, and the
clash with the police on the 30th October and the subsequent disarming of the
police by the Soviet authorities convinced them that, in a “ good cause ’ at least,
they could have matters pretty much their own way, In the later stages of this
agitation there began to be seen the rudiments of a party discipline which were
later to be developed. When the oil question was dropped there followed a month
of comparative inactivity, but during this time a new theme was being built up—
the demand for provincial councils (Anjuman lyalati), for which provision was
made in the Constitution of 1906, but which have never been formed, although it
would appear that some such council did function for a short time in Tabriz about
1906. At the same time party propagandists were trying to interest the peasants
in their programme, and agrarian reform was given prominence in all speeches.
On the 1st December a ‘‘ monster ” meeting was held which was supposed to be
attended by large numbers of peasants. In the event few country people turned
up and the crowd of 5,000 was chiefly composed of urban workers on whom the
Tudeh party and trade union could bring pressure. On the 11th January the
ct First Regional Conference of the Azerbaijan branches of the Tudeh Party ”
was held at Tabriz. It gave rise to alarming rumours among the more nervous
of the propertied citizens, but the resolutions it published contained nothing but
what the party spokesmen had been urging for months past. The most interesting
feature was a bid to attract Kurdish support. The party claimed that they were
promised support by certain chiefs of the Shakkak tribe, but the precise
nature of these promises is unknown. It can only be said that whatever those
particular chiefs may have promised, they can he relied on to carry out their
promises only if it suits their own personal interests. Since the conference there
has been an intensified recruiting drive and an effort to tighten up party
organisation and discipline.
10. It is difficult to see any clear distinction between the Freedom Front
(Jibhei Azadi) and Tudeh Persia. There can scarcely be any member of the former
who is not also a member of the latter and there would appear to be no good reason
for the formation of a second organisation, unless, indeed, the object be to absorb
Tudeh Persia in the Freedom Front, thus getting rid of some of the opprobrium
that attaches to the old name and making a wider appeal. The last six months
have seen a great many meetings and discussions about the organisation of these
bodies, with the publication of rules and regulations and orders for the election of
a bewildering number of sub-committees. But through the fog of resolutions and
proclamations may be dimly discerned the lineaments of some scheme in which
the Freedom Front stands as the supreme programme-drafting body and co
ordinator of all progressive opinion in the province, and from it stem two
executive bodies : the Tudeh party, charged with securing the election of Freedom
Front candidates and with putting forward the Freedom Front’s programme in
the Majlis; and the Workers’ Union (Shurai Muttahidei lyalati Ittihadiyehai
Kargaran va Zahmatkashan Azerbaijan—sometimes known by the shorter name
of Shurai Muttahidei lyalati Azerbaijan) which endeavours to put into practice
the Freedom Front’s economic and industrial programme. But in practice the
functions of the three bodies constantly overlap, and the same group of leaders
appears to dominate them all.
11. The programme-drafters have laboured to such purpose in recent months
that their latest published effort at generalisation comes to nothing more precise
than saying that the aim of the party is to improve things in general. But from
the speeches of the leaders more particular points can be picked out: The
preservation of the integrity and independence of Persia; the establishment of a
truly democratic and liberal Government; the formation of provincial councils to
safeguard local interests; agrarian reform; economic development; punishment
of “ traitors ” ; firm friendship with the Soviet Union, On the face of it there is
nothing in such a progamme to alarm anyone, but it is customary for the more
conservative part of the population to see the published progamme as a cloak for
more sinister goings-on inspired by the Soviet Consulate-General. According to
this view, the Freedom Front aims, at worst, at an independent, bolshevised
Azerbaijan; at best, a prolongation of the Russian occupation. It is true that
both the language and the actions of the Freedom Front belie the seeming mildness
of their pogramme. “Reactionaries” in the Central Government, such as
Seyyid Zia ud Din Tabatabai, and the local representatives of the Persian
Government are attacked in the most violent terms, and in the recruiting drive in