مجموعة ٢٨/١١٢أ "بلاد فارس. تبريز - رسائل شهرية عن الوضع الداخلي في أذربيجان وتقارير متنوعة." [ظ‎‎٥‎٨‎٧] (١٢٣٧/١١٧٧)

5. The situation in Kurdish Azerbaijan remains quiet, although there is
reported to be fighting at Saqqiz, not far away to the south, between the (io\ern-
ment forces under Sartip Amin aud the Kurds under Mohamed Rashid My
impression is that the Kurds in the Sauj Bulagh area are not anxious to be caught
between the Persian forces and the Soviet army, which would presumably reacts
quickly if the situation got out of hand so near its occupied zone. Moreover, some
of the Kurdish chieftains do not seem to be so happy as they were with the
present undefined position, in which Persian Government is almost completely
absent in their tribal areas, while Russian political officers, full of apparent
human kindness and subversive Communist ideas, flit about continually among
their henchmen in town and village. I have been in touch with Amir Asad,
chieftain of the Debukri tribes, who declares that he is going shortly to the Saqqiz
area to try and make peace with General Shahbakhti’s forces on behalf of the
Kurds. He is willing to organise a force of mounted Kurdish police to keep order
in the SaujT-Bulagh-Baneh area under the nominal auspices of the Tehran
Government; the latter are believed to have approved in theory but have not
provided—the monthly subsidy first required. There is now a Farmandar at
Sauj Bulagh, who seems surprisingly enough acceptable to the Kurds there, but
he is as timid as the rest. Amir Asad says that they might even allow the
gendarmerie to return there, but not of the former cruel, corrupt and rapacious
type; unfortunately there is no other, until the service has been reorganised from
top to bottom, especially as regards the officers.
6. The Kurdish chieftains probably realise that any idea of independence
is impossible; they would, however, like to have Kurdish officials in their own
districts, as in Northern Iraq, not far away. I asked whether Azerbaijani officials
appointed by Tehran would not be suitable; the reply was that such might be
more sympathetic in some ways, but would probably work for local interests and
not properly serve those of the Central Government. On the other hand, a Tehran
official of the usual type would neglect or ride roughshod over Azerbaijani
interests and susceptibilities and use his authority to line his own pockets as
quickly as possible. As I have said before, there seems to be no official patriotism
towards Persia as a whole any more.
7. The Kurds no longer walk about in Tabriz armed with pistols and rifles,
and this must be due to local Soviet intervention, following the complaints of the
Governor-General and the chief of police, who would not have dared to check
the practice on their own initiative. Enquiries I have made in Kurdish circles
seems to show that the Soviet authorities did not furnish arms and ammunition
to the Kurds as alleged by all the Persian officials; the arms were bought freely
in Tabriz by private Kurds, but in order to get them safely to their own district
past the Persian police posts along the road they applied for a Soviet officer to
escort the car or lorry concerned, and it appears that the Russians did kindly
provide the officer. This doubtless explains the story described in paragraph 6
of my despatch No. 1.
8. The Russian political officers who frequently visit Sauj Bulagh and
district (which is apparently not in the Soviet occupied zone) are named Alieff,
Nabieff and Salim. They are said to have promised a printing press to someone
in Sauj Bulagh. In Miandoab they are reported to be in close touch with the
Farmandar, a Kurd named Mehdi, wffio although appointed by the Governor-
General at Tabriz is alleged to sport a portrait of Bakhirofi, President of the
Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, in his office. Certain Kurds from Sauj Bulagh.
doubtless in order to obtain preferential Russian sugar and cotton goods from
the Soviet agency in Tabriz, or perhaps for more mischievous but equally petty
and selfish reasons, actually applied for Soviet citizenship to the consulate-
general here recently. Far from being repulsed, their applications were received
and officially considered (as I know for a fact), although they can have no possible
ties with the U.S.S.R. whatever. Disillusion came when they were told that
their wives and grown-up children must also say whether they wished equally
to become Soviet citizens, and they seem to have sheered off from the idea.
Incidentally the Soviet Consulate-General has been receiving an average of thirty
applications per day (sometimes as many as fifty) for Soviet citizenship from
nominal Persian subjects, but largely including nondescripts who formerly
belonged to the Caucasus and drifted here between 1928 and 1935—the so-called
“ muhajirs ” or refugees. It is possible that some will be accepted and return
to Soviet territory, and I do not imagine that the local Persian authorities will