مجموعة ٢٨/١١٢أ "بلاد فارس. تبريز - رسائل شهرية عن الوضع الداخلي في أذربيجان وتقارير متنوعة." [و‎‎٦‎٠‎٢] (١٢٣٧/١٢٠٦)

3
murders which he anticipated took place. Already he was being accused, he
stated, of being too lenient towards the Russians in his reports, and even this one
assassination would create a painful feeling.
6. Although I did not necessarily believe his statement that the shooting
was definitely the work of the Ogpu, I knew that German agents in Angora were
^doing their best to spread atrocity stories against the Soviet authorities in
Azerbaijan, and decided that, in case there were the slightest truth in the story,
I had better speak to the Russian military commander. As Major-General
Novikoff was away in Tiflis. I saw Major-General Khrashcheff and mentioned the
danger of any imprudent activities on the part of the Soviet political officers
here, as I had already done both in September and October when I noticed signs
of undesirable zeal iii that direction. I could not tell whether he already knew
of the alleged political murder, but he received my remarks very fairly and said
that it must be the work of agents provocateurs, adding that all his staff were
animated only by their strict orders to avoid interference in internal affairs in
Persia, to respect local feelings, and so on.
7. Of course, I accepted his comments, but personally I cannot persuade
myself that the Ogpu is as harmless here as all that. In previous reports I have
described their somewhat ridiculous goings-on, and at the theatre on the Soviet
anniversary of the 7th November I had the opportunity of seeing the heads of the
Politruk lined up on the stage, firing off speeches one after another, and a more
sinister-looking lot it would take a William le Queux to describe. The most
sinister is a Colonel Yarkoff, who appeared only about a month ago, and since
then I have sensed a growing influence of this unhealthy political side over the
whole Soviet staff and garrison. I feel that perhaps Major-General Novikcff is
strong enough to resist it, but unfortunately he is often away (or ill), and Colonel
Yarkoff has plenty of scope with the rest. I suspect that it was he who hindered
the British official war correspondents early in the month from doing any useful
reporting or photographing here at Tabriz, and he who has lately hindered Major
Proctor, our liaison officer, from establishing any contacts with Soviet officers
under the rank of a major-general, which is absurd.
8. Persians often say to me in a shocked tone how much propaganda the
Russians are doing, but they never seem to be able to give any precise details.
However, this week appeared what everyone admitted a magnificent propa
ganda documentary film, dealing with life in Soviet Armenia. Some local
Armenians have, of course, expressed a desire to go to the U.S.S.R. (at the time
when tables were set in the street at one place for signatures), but I hear that the
Soviet authorities have so far shown no hurry to accommodate them after all. I
continue to hear of nervousness among many Armenians, who fear dire conse
quences if the Russian military forces suddenly leave Persia and leave them to
the mercy of the local Moslems. The Turkish Consul-General professes to me to
be in a fix over this problem, as most of his Turkish subjects here are Armenians
who would rush to his consulate at the first sign of trouble or impending-
massacre, and he fears that the premises would be attacked by a murderous mob.
His fears may be a little exaggerated, but are by no means groundless, as in the
last war the local population did attack and massacre Armenians in the consulates
in Tabriz—and probably would do so again. This applies equally to the British
Consulate, which has no defences at all and is on the edge of the Armenian
quarter. If the Russian troops should suddenly leave, the local police, as I have
already reported, and as the chief of police himself confidentially admits, would
be quite incapable of preserving public order, and it is to be hoped, therefore,
that from a general standpoint some British troops could be sent here in time
before the Soviet forces moved out. The alternative would most probably be
massacres for a day or a couple of days, and then a Turkish military invasion of
Western Azerbaijan, possibly as far as Tabriz with armoured cars, which could
reach here in about nine hours from the frontier.
9. I learn that this season the sugar output at the Miandoab factory has
amounted to only 1,135 tons instead of the normal production of 5,000 tons, which
is a set-back to all in this district. As I wrote before, the Kurdish cultivators of
sugar-beet were either so busy looting that they did not worry to lift the crop, or
else they knew that transport was so scarce that they gave their beet to their
cattle to eat. Only 7,000 tons of beet reached the factory instead of about 30,000
needed.