أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎٤‎٤] (٢٩٠/٨٧)

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The Chairman pointed out that General Clayton’s policy of
doing nothing was only his second string, to be adopted if Wilson s
suggestion was not acceptable.
Wilson’s policy, he thought, was too abrupt, and might, as the
India Office suggested, lead to the immediate outbreak of hostilities.
He proposed, instead of a total stoppage of the subsidy, to reduce it
by half. The reduction could be made, as Wilson suggested, on
formal grounds. At the same time Ibn Saud could be informed
that we thought it had been a mistake for him to have come forward
and pressed his claim in the matter of Khurma, that we sympathised
with King Hussein in his refusal to tolerate the spectacle of a
militant and aggressive Wahabism so near the Hejaz, and that we
had decided to place no obstacle in the way of Hussein asserting his
authority there, should he choose to do so. Further, our attitude
towards Saud, and the possible stoppage of his entire subsidy, would
depend upon his conduct in this matter.
Mr. Kideton said that Wilson’s proposal to withdraw the whole
subsidy at once, as a preliminary to future bargaining, seemed
nearer the Oriental point of view than the Chairman’s suggestion.
Mr. Philby said he still thought the best way to contain the
Wahabi movement was to fix the boundaries by means of a Com
mission. In answer to a question by the Chairman he said he
preferred the tempered policy of a reduced subsidy to the total
stoppage proposed by Wilson.
The Conference decided —
1 . That the India Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office,
should prepare a telegram for Baghdad in the sense
indicated by the Chairman.
2. That the telegram be repeated by the Foreign Office to
Cairo.
(Initialled) C. of K.
Foreign Office,
March 10, 1919.