أوراق المؤتمر بين الإدارات حول شؤون الشرق الأوسط [و‎‎٧‎١] (٢٩٠/١٤١)

[987]—692
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.,!
Printed for the Voreign Office. June 1919.
SECRET.
I.D.C.E., 20th Minutes.
FOREIGN OFFICE.
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFIAIRS-
Minutes of Meeting held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, May 28, 1919
at 6.45 p.m.
Present:
The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.L, G.C.I.E
(in the Chair).
The Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, M.P.,
Secretary ol State lor India, India Office.
Mr. J. E. Shuckburgh, C.B., India Office.
Lieut.-Col. W. H. Gribbon, C.M.G.,
War Office.
Mr. G. J. Kidston, Foreign Office.
Mr. F. H. Nixon, Treasury.
Mr. H. H. St. J. B. Philby.
Major H. W. Young, D.S.O. (Secretary).
Tbn Sand and
King Hussein.
The Conference had before them a telegram from General
Glenby, No. 857, dated the 27th May, 1919.
The Chairman said that at the last meeting at which the
elations between King Hussein and Ibn Sand were discussed
] D.C.E. 12th Minutes), and at which Sir Reginald M/ingate and
dr Philby were present, the solution arrived at was m the nature
a compromise: Ibn Sand’s subsidy was to be reduced by one halt,
md he was to be warned that our subsequent attitude towards him
vould be dependent upon his own attitude at Khurma. There
iad been some delay in the delivery of the message to Ibn baud
L'lie intention had originally been that it should be communicated
iimultaneously to Ibn Saud and King Hussein, but when General
Allenby heard that the message was held up at Bahrein he had
•epeated his former recommendation that the terms should be
stiffened and that Ibn Saud should be threatened with the cutting
iff of the whole of his subsidy instead of a half. It had been
iecided to adhere to the policy of the Conference, and General
Allenby had been instructed accordingly, but meanwhile another
letter had been received from Ibn Saud in which he. repeated his
3 tier to submit the question in dispute to the arbitration ot His
Maiesty’s Government. It was to be presumed that the message
Pad by now reached both sides. We knew that King Hussein had
in anv case received it and was satisfied. He had regarded the
decision as being on the whole in his favour, and had immediately
appointed an Amir for Khurma. It was not clear whether this
appointment was made as a definite act of aggression, or merelv
as an assertion of his authority in the district over which we had
recognised his sovereignty. The next step had been that Ibn baud,
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