رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [و‎‎١‎٥‎٢] (٤٤٢/٣٠٣)

1967
196S
Supply (Committee).
Foreign Office.
10 July 1912
Russian Government. I do not believe the
statement that very few people were
executed, nor do I believe the accounts
which have been given of the origin of
those disturbances. But whatever may be
the case, one thing is certain, that the
Russian Government and the Russian
troops took the occasion of those disturb
ances to execute most of the Nationalist
leaders at Tabriz who had been mainly
instrumental m destroying the Govern
ment of the late Shah and bringing about
the revolution in Persia. If the ex-Shah
comes back it will be said, “Well, the
people have accepted the ex-Shah, and we
do not control the people there.” In that
case the people would be the Russian
troops and the Russian agents. This is
the condition of things with which we are
face to face, and I appeal to the right hon.
Gentleman to make some strong statement
which will convey to the people of Persia
an assurance that, so far as the British
Government goes, we mean to stand
honourably by the very slender assurances
which have been given.
Mr. MARK SYKES: There is one point
in regard to the speech of the hon. Gentle
man who has just sat down which I should
like to draw attention to. His comments
on Lord Kitchener’s administration in
Egypt are practically the same as his com
ments upon the work which Sir Horace
Plunkett did in Ireland. The hon. Mem
ber cannot possibly forget anyone who
brings order and prosperity to a distracted
country. I can perfectly well understand
it, because order and prosperity in coun
tries like Ireland and Egypt are opposed
to the kind of politics in which Nationalists
take a part, although I have the greatest
respect for many of them. It is very diffi
cult to speak on foreign affairs unless one
knows what is going to happen in the Medi
terranean. If w T e are really going to aban
don the Mediterranean, then the whole of
our foreign policy must undergo a complete
and profound change. It is impossible to
consider that question until that matter is
cleared up. It may be inconvenient to
refer to this subject in this particular De
bate, and perhaps w'e may have to wait
until the Debate on Imperial Defence has
taken place before we know the exact posi
tion. Meanwhile, it is hardly possible to
touch upon any matter affecting our rela
tions with Mediterranean Powers ; it is
hardly possible to touch iipon such ques
tions until this matter has been cleared up.
With regard to the question of the Dar
danelles, I wish to express a hope that
there should be no change in our attitude
of the method in which it is regarded by
other Powers until our definite Mediter
ranean policy has been made public, and
until this House has been given an oppor
tunity of discussing that one particular
subject. This question has been brought
prominently to one’s mind by the brief
closing of the Dardanelles and the extra
ordinary effect it had on English commerce,
for it brought poverty and misery into the
homes of some of the poorest workers in
this country owing to ships being kept in
the Dardanelles, thus showing that our
foreign policy is one which affects not only
the rich, but the poor as well.
In what I am about to say I do not wish
to criticise Russia, or give the impression
that there is any Member of the British
Parliament who does not want to see a
friendly understanding established be
tween England and Russia. I do, how
ever, wish to say that the Trans-Persian
line through Persia is calculated to sow
the seeds of distrust between England and
Russia. On this matter I am inclined to
agree very much ; not with the views of the
hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon)
but with his facts. It seems to me that
the Persia we have known is practically
no more, and possibly the Anglo-Russian
Treaty may have accelerated this matter.
The question is what is going to happen to
Persia 1 It is so poor a country, with such
large areas of desert, so sparse a popula
tion, and so few revenues, that the question
we have to face now is how is Persia going
to be developed! It can be developed in
the first place either by a military occupa
tion running along the railways, down the
Southern centre of Persia, or in the second
place by the gradual introduction of com
merce and civilisation in the more accessi
ble parts along the Gulf and by smaller
branch lines. If the first course is to be
taken and the Trans-Persian Railway is
constructed it must have garrisons all
along that line. You cannot have
a railway like that in a country
partly desert without the people coming
down to cut away the telegraph and
damage the railways, and you will have to
guard it, and the Persian Government
cannot afford troops for that purpose. The
consequence will be that Russia will guard
her zone, and we shall have to guard our
zone; and therefore the sentries will be
standing face to face. That really is not
a business proposition. I do not think that
it is conceited to say that railways are
built to take the goods down to the sea to