رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٣] (٤٤٢/٣٠٦)

1973 Supply (Committee). HOUSE OF
COMMONS Foreign Office. 1974
[Sir E. Grey.]
were going to take advantage of the chaos
and the situation to prejudice her
interests, and the old state of suspicion, of
intrigue, and squabble, which used to exist
between Great Britain and Russia, would
have been intensified many fold under the
present condition of affairs. Instead of
that, however much we may differ as to the
merits of the Agreement, there has never
been for a moment any suspicion on either
side that either Russia or Great Britain
has been attempting to exploit the situation
in Persia to the disadvantage of the other.
The fact that that has been so has not
only been in the interest of the two coun
tries, but has also been in the interests of
peace. I admit I have not gone into
details, but that really is a truer perspec
tive of the whole question than that sug
gested by the hon. Member for East Mayo,
which leaves out of account past history
and most material facts of the situation
essential to forming a true judgment on
the working of the Anglo-Russian Agree
ment.
I now come to some of the questions
which the Noble Lord opposite asked. He
made a criticism that our policy in Persia
in certain details connected, for instance,
with the South of Persia, had been incon
sistent, and he quoted some words of mine
which, he said, showed inconsistency. It
may be there does exist somewhere some
one who, having been at the Foreign Office
for the last seven years, and having
written as many telegrams and signed as
many despatches and made as many
speeches as I have on Persia, and with the
condition of Persian affairs being so dis
tracting, so vascillating, and so chaotic,
yet would not have uttered a single sen
tence that would have been inconsistent.
It may be so, and, therefore, when the
Noble Lord says I have committed some
inconsistencies, I quite admit that in one
or two of the things he said there are
verbal inconsistencies. I quite admit it
has been so, but I do not think there has
been anj r inconsistency about our policy
as a whole. We have always been opposed
to sending anything like an expedition to
the South of Persia. We did reinforce the
Consular Guards last year, because we
were told at the time there was real danger
to life at Shiraz, but we purposely re
stricted their actions so that we might not
be committed to a large expedition. It
is quite true, as the hon. Member for Brad
ford (Sir G. Scott Robertson) said, there
has been less disorder and less interference
with trade in the North of Persia because
Russia has so many troops there. It is
true there has been more disorder in the
South of Persia. It is also true that, if
we had liked to use the force and the
troops and to undertake liabilities and re
sponsibilities in the South of Persia, we
might have done much to keep the roads
open, but we are most reluctant to embark
on a policy of that kind, because although
the beginning is very easy, the ending is
very difficult. I frankly admit the damage
to trade. On the other hand, we do not
want to increase our responsibilities and
to incur enormous liabilities, and we still
hold—and that is why we have not done
more than we have—to the policy that we
should, as long as we possibly can, avoid
intervention likely to be of a permanent
kind in the South of Persia.
The Noble Lord asked me if a further
large loan is likely to be made in the near
future. Honestly, I wish I could say yes,
but honestly, with the state of things in
Persia as it is, it is very difficult to see
how a large loan is to be made on practic
able terms. Persia wants money, no
doubt, but it is no use lending money
unless it is likely to be effectively spent.
The Noble Lord asks me if they get funds,
will they be able to restore order in the
south of the country 1 ? The Swedish
officers employed by the Persian Govern
ment are now engaged in organising
gendarmerie for the south, and in the
event of any support being given by us to
a loan we should certainly stipulate that
some of the money should be spent on
the restoration of order on the southern
roads. Then he asked me whether we
are contemplating any measures for re
storing order in the south except by
financing the Persian Government. I
have really answered that by anticipation.
We do not at the present time contem
plate any measures, because no measures
would be effected, except, of course,
encouraging and helping by any diplo
matic influence we have in Persia the
work of the Swedish officers who, under
the Persian Government, are organising
gendarmerie. All that, of course, we are
doing. Beyond that we do not contem
plate any measure for the protection of
the roads.
EARL of RONALDSHAY: Am I to
understand it is not contemplated to ac
cede to the suggestion of the Government