رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٤] (٤٤٢/٣٠٨)

1977
Supply (Committee).
Foreign Office. 1978
HOUSE OF COMMONS
[Sir E. Grey.]
liberty of action before we can support any
particular line. We have specified certain
points. We have told the Societe d’Etude
that though we do not in principie__pppose
the Trttn s-Pers ian lEflilway, and should,
under proper conditions, be favourable to
the principle, we must reserve to ourselves
full freedom of action when it comes to
actual construction and subsequent man
agement. We must reserve the right to be
consulted with regard to the alignment of
the railway, the constitution of the Board,
the representation of British interests, in
general about freight and passenger rates,
and especially in regard to the break of
. the gauge. We reserved all these points.
If the Trans-Persian Railway scheme be-
; comes feasible, I think before it receives
l support from the British Government we
should have to come to an agreement with
Russia with regard to the branch lines to
be made, with regard to the retention and
control of lines in the British sphere, and
with regard to equality of treatment for
British trade. All that will have to be
gone into by any British Government
] which has to consider a definite scheme for
a Trans-Persian railway, and we have re
served absolute liberty to ourse lves o n
those points. With regard to brealToT the
garrg£, The" 7 first idea was that it should
be at Bander Abbas point. There is great
force in many of the objections which have
been raised to breaking the gauge there,
but the whole question is one we must care
fully consider before we are committed to
^ any scheme. I will tell the House what I
propose to do about this. When the Societe
d’Etude has reported whether it is feasible
to make the railway, and, if so, where it
should be made, I think the House ought
to be informed what the proposal of ,1%
Societe d’Etude is. The wkcTe" ques
tion is one of such great importance
to India that all its leading aspects
ought to be considered carefully
in India, and I think the House should
know what the result of the investigations
of the Societe d’Etudes has been, and what
is actually proposed, and should also hear
from the Government of the day under
what conditions they are prepared to con
sent to any definite scheme for a Trans-
> Persian railway before the country is
absolutely committed to the support of it:
There is one more point which the Noble
Lord made about the Mohamerah line. I
must look into that point a little more
closely. It is one that has escaped my
memory for the time being. I have
always contemplated that the line from
Mohamerah would, if a concession was
made, be a concession to a British com
pany. Of course if it goes further north
into tKe Russian sphere, we cannot have a
British company with a concession in that
.sphere. Something has been said about
| internationalising. I should like to recon-
^ sider that point. I will only say that I have
hitherto contemplated a British company
| getting the concession. I shall certainly
bear carefully in mind what construction
is to be put upon any internationalisation
which may be applied to the southern part
of the railway. I should like to examine
the point a little further. At the present
moment nothing is under consideration,
i except whether the Persian Government
is prepared or in a position to grant a con
cession to a British companj" for a line
’from Mohamerah.
Perhaps I had better continue with the
railways and get rid of that subject. There
is a question as to negotiations with
Turkey about the Baghdad Railway. I
was asked if we had committed ourselves
to any scheme. No, we have not.
The negotiations have been carried on
with Turkey alone because Turkey made
an agreement with Germany under which
she recovered her liberty of action sub
ject to one or two conditions in regard to
the railway below Baghdad. Therefore
Turkey is in a position to negotiate alone
with regard to the railway below Baghdad.
The German Government of course is per
fectly aware that the negotiations are
going on, and directly German interests
are affected we shall be perfectly ready
to discuss the matter with the German
Government. But at the present moment,
of course, the basis of negotiation is
whether we shall give our consent to the
increase of Turkish Customs which Turkey
wants, and the one great object we wish to
secure is that there shall be an understand
ing between us and Turkey about the
status quo of questions in the Persian
Gulf in general. That is not mixed up
with the railway from Baghdad to Basra.
It must not go beyond that. An agree
ment with Turkey as to a satisfactory
status quo in the Persian Gulf, which wiil
make it perfectly clear to Turkey that we
are not going to infringe her rights, and
which will make it equally clear to us that
there is a signed documentary understand
ing between us and Turkey under which
our position in the Persian Gulf, to which
we attach importance, will not be inter
fered with, would really be a very satis
factory arrangement in itself. We are