رسائل وأوراق بخصوص السكة الحديدية العابرة لبلاد فارس والسكك الحديدية الأخرى في بلاد فارس [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٥] (٤٤٢/٣١٠)

1981
Supply (Committee). HOUSE OF COMMONS Foreign Office. 1982
[Sir E. Grey.]
“Times” a short time ago protesting
against its exclusion from Egypt, and to
say that he was opposed to the British
occupation there. I did not think it neces
sary to exclude the paper, but when the
Egyptian Government decided to exclude
this paper from Egypt, in view of what I
have seen, and in view of the fact that the
chairman of the company himself writes
to say that he is opposed to the British
occupation, I certainly came to the con
clusion that it was not an occasion upon
which we should send instructions to inter
fere with the discretion of the Egyptian
Government. I think Lord Kitchener and
the Egyptian Government were perfectly
right in dealing with the matter in the way
they did.
I will go to one or two still larger ques
tions. The Mediterranean policy was
raised by an hon. Member opposite in re
gard to the reduction of the forces in the
Mediterranean. In fact, the question he
really raised was one of greatest import
ance, and so large that it is very difficult
to handle generally. If I understand
aright, it is the question of the relation
between foreign policy and naval strategy.
He read a quotation, which I had not
heard of before, from a newspaper, saying
that we had surrendered naval predomi
nance in the Far East to Japan, in the
West to the United States, and that we
were now going to surrender it in the
Mediterranean to a third Power. I do not
know what the context of that extract
was, or whether the newspaper thought it
right or wrong that we should have done it.
Mr. BA IR D : Wrong.
Sir E. GREY : Was it its opinion that we
should maintain a separate sufficient
margin of strength to protect our own
islands in the Home waters; a sufficient
margin of strength to rule independently in
the Far East, and a sufficient margin of
strength to keep up our strength perma
nently, I suppose, both in the West in the
Atlantic, and in the East in the Pacific, and
a separate standard in the Mediterranean
also ? That is absolutely out of the ques
tion. I would ask the Committee to bear
in mind that it is exceedingly difficult to be
definite about this, because it is, though
very important, still a question so full of
graduations and degrees and so large that
it is very difficult to be very definite about
it. I will try to break it up into two
definite parts. In the first place, you must
not rely upon your foreign policy to pro
tect the United Kingdom. That is to say,
if you let your margin of naval strength in
home waters fall below that which may be
brought to bear against you rapidly, you
are setting foreign policy a task you ought
not to set it. The risk of an attack on the
United Kingdom, stronger in force than we
could meet with the ships we keep in home
waters, is one not to be settled by
diplomacy. You must keep up a sufficient
margin of naval strength in home waters
whatever your foreign policy is. If you do
not, your foreign policy will become impos
sible, because in every diplomatic situa
tion that arises, if you are inferior in
strength in home waters to a neighbouring
fleet or fleets, in every diplomatic ques
tion you will have to give way, and your
position will not be that of a great Power.
Therefore, in discussing this question of
the connection of foreign policy with naval
strength, I should like to rule out the ques
tion of what margin we ought to have in
home waters, because, whatever your
foreign policy is, you must keep a sufficient
margin of strength in home waters. This
is not a question whether anybody wishes
to attack in one year or another, it is
merely a question that you must fall into
a position of inferiority if your margin in
home waters is insufficient.
When you get further afield into other
parts of the world it is a very different
matter; then foreign policy and naval
strategy do and must depend upon each
other to a large extent. Take the question
of the Far East. Of course, the relation
between the Japanese Alliance and naval
strategy is a most intimate one. I should
like to say this about the Japanese
Alliance. It is worth while considering at
the present moment, that with all the in
stability there is in China, and the difficult
questions which arise, there has so far
been no fear whatever of international
complications. The good working of the
Japanese Alliance in recent years has been
a great factor for peace. In the last few
years, while we have been in office—I do
not say because we have been in office—the
Japanese Alliance has worked nothing but
good. It has not brought us into
worse relations with any other Power.
It has not brought Japan into
worse relations. On the contrary,
relations between Japan and Russia are
now exceedingly good. I believe that the
Japanese Alliance is more than ever to the
mutual interests of the two countries ; that
they have worked it with great and per
fect accord, and that it has been a great